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1. Introduction and summary 
What is the best voting system for choosing a single winner from several candidates? In 2015 I 
was led reluctantly to the conclusion that the minimax system, invented independently by Simpson 
(1969) and Kramer (1977), appears to be the best voting system for these elections. My own prior guess 
was that the Coombs system was best. But when I devised five very different computer-simulation tests 
of a system’s ability to pick the best winner, minimax won all of them by wide margins; see Darlington 
(2016) or Section 5 of the current paper. That led me to study closely the well-known minimax 
anomalies – artificial-data examples in which minimax clearly seems to select the wrong winner. As 
described in Section 4, I found good reasons to ignore every one of those anomalies. (As experts know 
well, every voting system has anomalies; minimax is by no means unique in having them.) Minimax has 
other advantages involving simplicity, transparency, voter privacy, and resistance to attempts at 
insincere strategic voting and other types of manipulation. Altogether, several different lines of evidence 
and reasoning lead separately to the conclusion that minimax is the best voting system for most 
elections, with other Condorcet-consistent systems being the next best. 
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 Unfortunately, I must disappoint readers seeking a short and simple path to this conclusion. In 
the last 750 years analysts have proposed over 20 voting systems (most in the last century), and there is 
no easy way to dismiss all of them at once. More detailed descriptions of the area appear in Tideman 
(2006), Saari (2001), and Felsenthal (2012). This paper is designed to be useful to both beginners and 
experts in this area. The paper’s sections are arranged in the order which I believe beginners will find 
most useful. But more knowledgeable readers can read Sections 3-8 in almost any order. Section 2 
briefly describes 18 voting systems identified by Felsenthal (2012) as the ones most worthy of detailed 
analysis. Section 3 summarizes the anomalies and weaknesses of many of these systems. Section 4 
analyzes eight anomalies in minimax, arguing that there are good reasons to ignore all of them. Sections 
3-4 show that even before we examine computer simulations, there are several different ways to 
conclude that minimax is best. 
 Section 5 turns to computer simulations. It considers two different models of voter behavior – 
models I’ll call “excellence” and “spatial.” In the former, candidates differ on only a single dimension we 
might call “excellence.” In a spatial model, political issues which divide voters are represented by spatial 
axes, each voter and each candidate appears as a dot in that space, and each voter is presumed to 
prefer the candidates closest to themselves. A large study of hundreds of real elections, by Tideman and 
Plassmann (2012), found that spatial models fitted this data far better than excellence models did. 
Section 5 describes several quite different spatial-model simulation studies, all of which minimax won by 
wide margins. Skeptical experts in voting theory are urged to read at least Sections 4 and 5.  
Section 6 discusses minimax’s resistance to insincere strategic voting. Section 7 examines 
several variants and close relatives of minimax, and chooses as best a system I call minimax-PM. Section 
8 describes in more detail some of the problems with other voting systems, including a good deal of 
original material. Section 8 was placed last mainly because it’s quite long and is summarized in Section 3.  
Several sections also show the substantial and consistent superiority of Condorcet-consistent 
systems (not just minimax) over other voting systems. I do not claim to have established the superiority 
of minimax and other Condorcet-consistent systems for all time, beyond all possible future evidence and 
analysis. But I do claim that several very different lines of evidence and reasoning suggest this 
conclusion given our current knowledge.  
2. The variety of voting systems 
This section says a little about each of the 18 voting systems analyzed by Felsenthal (2012). 
Nearly everyone has used the very simple plurality (vote for one) system. Another system with very 
simple ballots is approval voting, in which each voter approves as many candidates as they wish, and 
the candidate with the most approvals wins. Also simple and moderately familiar is plurality runoff, 
which uses plurality voting followed by a runoff election between the top two candidates.  
Several other systems use ranked-choice ballots, in which voters rank the candidates. Some of 
these systems are positional systems, meaning that the winner is determined by the ranks received by 
each candidate. Four positional systems are especially well known. The Hare system is also called instant 
runoff voting (IRV) or single transferable vote (STV). In that system the candidate with the fewest first-
place ranks is removed, and the ranks of all other candidates are recomputed as if that one candidate 
had never run. That process is repeated until only one candidate is left. The Hare system is often called 
“ranked-choice voting” (RCV), but it is actually just one of several systems using ranked-choice ballots. 
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The Coombs system is like Hare, except the candidate removed in each round is the one with the most 
last-place ranks rather than the one with the fewest first-place ranks. In the Borda system, we find for 
each candidate X the number of candidates ranked below X by each voter. Summing these values across 
voters gives each candidate’s Borda count. The one with the highest Borda count is the winner. Thus if 
there are no tied or missing ranks, the Borda winner is the candidate with the highest mean rank. In the 
Bucklin system a candidate wins if they receive a majority of the first-place ranks. If there is no winner 
by that rule, each candidate’s number of “high ranks” is expanded to include second-place ranks, and 
any candidate who receives “high ranks” from over half the voters is the winner. If there is still no 
winner, “high ranks” are expanded to include third-place ranks. And so on. If two or more candidates all 
receive “high ranks” from over half the voters, the one with the most high ranks is the winner.  
Some non-positional systems use rating scales. In range voting, each voter rates each candidate 
on a multi-point scale, often ranging from 0 to 100, and the candidate with the highest mean rating 
wins. The majority judgment system also uses a rating scale, though the points on the scale have non-
numeric verbal labels like “excellent” and “poor,” and the number of points on the scale is much smaller 
– usually 5 to 8. The winner is the candidate with the highest median rating. A tie-breaker described in 
Section 8.3.1 breaks nearly all ties. These two systems are the best-known rating-scale systems. 
 If ballots use ranks or rating scales, election managers can use the ballots to run a two-way race 
between each pair of candidates. If a candidate wins all their two-way races by majority rule, they are 
called a Condorcet winner. A voting system has Condorcet consistency (CC) if any Condorcet winner is 
named the winner. Surprisingly, none of the voting systems just described has CC, although all of them 
seem reasonable at first glance.  
A Condorcet paradox occurs if there is no Condorcet winner. There is then a Condorcet cycle of 
three or more candidates. In a typical cycle, A beats B by majority rule, and B beats C, but C beats A. In 
the simplest possible example, one voter ranks three candidates as ABC, one as BCA, and one as CAB. 
Then A beats B 2:1, B beats C, and C beats A. Large studies by Gehrlein (2006) and Tideman and 
Plassmann (2012) both found that Condorcet paradoxes occur only occasionally in real data, but they 
are common enough that it’s important to handle them as well as possible.  
All the CC systems below are described by Felsenthal. CC systems typically allow tied ranks. If a 
voter fails to rank a candidate, they are typically presumed to rank them below anyone whom they did 
rank explicitly. I agree with those rules. All these systems name any Condorcet winner as winner, so we 
describe only what they do under a Condorcet paradox. In that event the Black system names the Borda 
winner as winner. The Copeland winner is the candidate who wins the largest number of their two-way 
races. It was recently discovered that this system had been proposed by 1283, for electing church 
officials, by Cardinal Ramon Llull; see Colomer (2013). In the Young system, we find for each candidate X 
the smallest number of voters who would have to be removed to turn X into a Condorcet winner, and 
the winner is the one for whom that number is smallest. In the Dodgson system, an “interchange” 
occurs if a voter switches two candidates whom they had ranked adjacently, as when a voter changes 
the ABCD ranking to ACBD or ABDC. The Dodgson winner is the candidate who would need the fewest 
interchanges, summed across voters, to become a Condorcet winner. In the Nanson system, all 
candidates with Borda counts below the mean are removed and Borda counts are then recomputed. 
That process is repeated until only one candidate is left. Nanson is the only system mentioned here 
which has CC even though it never explicitly examines the results of all possible two-way races. That’s 
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because a Condorcet winner doesn’t always have the highest of all Borda counts, but it never has a 
Borda count below the mean of those counts, and thus is never eliminated by Nanson. 
Minimax has CC. If there is no Condorcet winner, we find each candidate’s largest margin of loss 
in their two-way races. Call that margin LL for “largest loss.” The candidate with the smallest LL is the 
winner. Some writers define the size of candidate X’s loss in a two-way race not as a margin but as the 
number of voters who voted against X. The two definitions may yield different minimax winners if there 
are tied or missing ranks. My reasons for defining losses as margins appear in a discussion of “minimax-
WV” in Section 7. That section also describes minimax-PM, a new tie-breaking system for minimax which 
is simple and intuitively reasonable, breaks nearly all ties, and is shown by simulations to pick better 
winners than random tie-breakers. 
 So far we have named 9 voting systems without CC, and 6 with CC. The Kemeny and Schwartz 
systems are also included by Felsenthal (2012). Both have CC. The Schwartz system is the only one of 
Felsenthal’s 8 CC systems which fails the Pareto criterion. That means it can select one winner X even 
though Y is preferred to X by every single voter. That failure seems especially unacceptable to me. The 
Schwartz system is otherwise quite similar to the Schulze system, which satisfies the Pareto criterion 
and is used much more widely that Schwartz. The Schwartz system is not ultimately recommended by 
Felsenthal or in an earlier major review of voting systems by Tideman (2006). So we shall in effect 
substitute Schulze for Schwartz in the rest of this paper. We later describe the major disadvantages of 
the Kemeny and Schulze systems but do not describe their computations, which are fairly complex.  
 The last of Felsenthal’s 18 systems is successive elimination. If there are c candidates this 
system uses a series of c-1 two-way votes, with the loser of each vote eliminated from all later votes. 
This system is sometimes used within legislatures to choose among several versions of a bill. But it is 
clearly unsuitable for ordinary elections, both because it requires so many separate votes and because 
the final outcome can depend heavily on the order of the votes, which may be arbitrary or manipulated 
by insiders. This system is not mentioned again, leaving 17 systems to analyze: 3 with very simple 
ballots, 4 positional systems, 2 with rating scales, and 8 with CC. 
3. Some electoral criteria violated by minimax’s competitors 
A voting system is said to suffer an anomaly if an artificial example can be created which 
demonstrates some clearly undesirable property of the system, such as if giving candidate X a higher 
rank can sometimes make X lose. An electoral criterion is a rule requiring the absence of a particular 
anomaly. Electoral theorists have widely agreed for decades that every known voting system, and 
indeed every possible system, suffers from at least one anomaly, and often from several. The extensive 
literature on this topic almost never asks how likely any anomaly is to occur in real data, since there has 
been no very practical way to answer such questions. I’ll distinguish anomalies from weaknesses or 
problems, for which there is no real doubt about the frequency of the problem. For instance, vote-
splitting is a ubiquitous problem in plurality elections with more than two candidates; candidates A and 
B might both be able to beat C in two-way races, but they both lose to C in a plurality election because 
they split their vote. Of the items discussed in the rest of this section, I would classify most as 
“weaknesses” because there is little serious doubt about their potential frequency. But the first item 
(nonmonotonicity) is more of an anomaly. 
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Monotonicity. Define a simple vote change as a change by one or more voters who all vote 
identically and then all change their votes identically. A voting system is nonmonotonic if a simple vote 
change ever changes the election’s outcome in the opposite direction from the obvious intention of 
those voters. Thus a system is nonmonotonic if any of these outcomes could ever occur: 
     1. Candidate X changes from a winner to a loser when a simple vote change raises X’s ranking without  
         changing the ranks of other candidates relative to each other. 
     2. X changes from a loser to a winner when the change lowers X’s ranking without changing the ranks 
         of other candidates relative to each other. 
     3. X changes from a winner to a loser when new identical voters appear, all ranking X first. 
     4. X changes from a loser to a winner when new identical voters appear, all ranking X last. 
Felsenthal and Nurmi (2017) show that of the voting systems in Section 2, the only ones with 
monotonicity are plurality, approval, Borda, range voting, and minimax. It is not known how common 
nonmonotonicity is in real data, but the mere fact that it’s possible might provide to some voters a 
convenient excuse to not bother voting. So monotonic systems are definitely preferable. 
 Strategic voting. Voters may sometimes gain some advantage by voting insincerely or 
strategically. For instance, suppose A and B are a voter’s favorite candidates in that order, but the voter 
rates or ranks B at the very bottom to try to prevent B from beating A. That maneuver is called 
“burying.” Nonmonotonicity may occasionally offer other opportunities for strategic voting. The 
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, discussed in Tideman (2006, 143-148), says essentially that in single-
winner elections with more than two candidates, no reasonable rank-based voting system can be 
entirely resistant to strategic voting in all circumstances. But the degree of resistance can vary greatly. In 
a mild case, strategic voting might be effective only given three conditions: (1) there are special 
circumstances, such as one or even two Condorcet cycles, (2) the number of cooperating strategic voters 
must at least approximate the margin of victory they wish to overcome, and (3) those voters must know 
quite accurately how others are voting, including the special circumstances like Condorcet cycles. If they 
guess wrong about this, they may hurt themselves. In such cases, strategic voting is probably little real 
danger. Sections 4.2 and 6 illustrate cases like this involving minimax. But in the worst case, none of 
these conditions is required – a landslide election with no special circumstances might be tipped by just 
a few strategic voters who need not know how others are voting, and who run no risk that their 
strategic maneuvers will backfire. Section 8.3.2 gives artificial-data but realistic examples in which 
landslide elections, in which one candidate wins by a 10% margin under sincere voting, are tipped if 1% 
of voters vote strategically under range voting, or 1.4% under majority judgment. Section 8.2.1 gives less 
extreme but fairly similar examples for the Borda and Coombs systems, and Section 8.4 for Dodgson.  
 Completeness. I’ll call a ballot “incomplete” if it doesn’t allow a voter to express a preference 
between every pair of candidates. Among the systems considered here, the only ones suffering this 
problem are plurality, approval, and plurality with runoff. For instance, suppose in an approval election a 
voter would rank the candidates ABCD, and that voter chooses to approve A and B. But if it later turns 
out that the top two candidates are A and B, or are C and D, the voter has in effect been prevented from 
voting in the two-way race which determines the final winner. Incomplete ballots are often assumed to 
make voting easier, but Section 8.1 explains why that’s not so. Thus those ballots are unacceptable. 
Incomplete systems were consistently among the worst performers in all the simulation studies 
mentioned in Section 5; see for instance Tables 2 and 3 in that section.  
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 Of our 17 voting systems, minimax is the only one passing all of the three criteria discussed so 
far. But many systems also fail other criteria named below. 
 Simplicity. A system fails this criterion if the average citizen would find it difficult even to 
understand the system or explain it to others. In my opinion the well-known Kemeny and Schulze 
systems clearly fail this criterion. As mentioned in Section 2, the goals of the Dodgson and Young 
systems are easily described. But papers cited in Section 8.4 show their computations can be a challenge 
even for modern computers. Thus these two systems also fail our simplicity criterion. 
 Ease of voting. Plurality and approval ballots are often assumed to make voting easier than 
ranked-choice or rating-scale ballots. But plurality ballots certainly aren’t easy for a voter who prefers 
some candidates over others but likes two or more top candidates equally well. And Section 8.1 explains 
why approval ballots can actually make voting very difficult for the voter who wants to maximize their 
influence, as most voters do. But ranked-choice ballots can make voting surprisingly easy if tied and 
missing ranks are allowed. Then voting will be even easier than plurality voting for anyone who likes two 
or more top candidates equally well, and also easier than approval voting (see Section 8.1). If there are 
many candidates, voting may be quite difficult with rating scales or with ranked-choice ballots if tied and 
missing ranks are not allowed. That’s often the case with the Hare and Coombs systems, since those 
systems must know at each stage of the elimination process which one candidate is each voter’s top or 
bottom choice among those remaining. CC systems allow tied and missing ranks, so voting may be easier 
with them than with any other system. 
Resistance to vote-splitting and spoiling. These problems arise primarily with plurality voting 
and with Hare. A Smith set is a set of candidates, any one of whom could beat any candidate outside the 
set in a two-way race using majority rule (MR). In plurality voting, the vote-splitting problem arises if the 
candidates in a Smith set are so similar to each other that they all lose because they split the votes of 
the voters attracted to those candidates. The similar “spoiler” problem arises if there is one candidate X 
who could beat anyone else in a two-way race, but one or more less-popular candidates take some of 
X’s votes so that X loses to some other candidate. The next paragraph shows how Hare shares these 
same problems.  
 Condorcet consistency (CC). Several different lines of reasoning can lead to the conclusion that 
CC is essential. Many people simply consider the point to be self-evident. Others may be persuaded by 
the fact that all non-CC systems are eliminated by the needs for monotonicity, completeness, and 
reasonable resistance to burying. Still others are persuaded by the argument that CC is politically 
necessary just because so many ordinary citizens consider it important. This was illustrated by the 2009 
mayoral race in Burlington, VT, a liberal university town which had recently adopted the Hare system. In 
that race, Hare eliminated the Democratic candidate before either the Republican or Progressive 
candidate (who won), even though the Democratic candidate was the Condorcet winner, beating each 
of five other candidates in two-way races. Voters found that bizarre and promptly voted to abandon the 
Hare system. Section 8.5 explains how this can happen, and why we might expect to see it fairly often.  
 Sensitivity to differences in vote changes (SDVC). I invented this criterion, and Section 4.5 
discusses it at length. Suppose candidate X is a Condorcet winner, or could become one if just one voter 
changed their vote to put X at the top. Suppose any other candidate would need at least k such changes 
to become a Condorcet winner. A voting system fails SDVC if it would ever make X a loser no matter how 
large k is – even in the thousands or millions. I think of SDVC as a useful variant of CC. Both those criteria 
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focus on the number of vote changes each candidate needs to become a Condorcet winner. But SDVC 
says that if the differences in those numbers are large enough, one of them needn’t actually be 0 to 
determine the winner. SDVC could accept a system which violates CC: if A was a CC winner, and B lost 
one two-way race by just a few votes, and system Q named B the winner, then Q would violate CC but 
not SDVC. Despite this relative “laxness” of SDVC, the only of our 17 systems which satisfy SDVC are 
Dodgson, Young, and minimax. Section 8.4 shows that Dodgson and Young fail criteria of simplicity, 
monotonicity, and transparency (not discussed here in Section 3), and Dodgson is highly susceptible to 
burying.  
 Thus we will reject all of these 17 systems except minimax if we adopt any one of the following 
sets of criteria: 
●Monotonicity, completeness, and substantial resistance to strategic voting 
●Monotonicity and either CC or SDVC 
●SDVC and either monotonicity or simplicity or transparency 
Section 4.5 mentions several newer voting systems which all satisfy CC but violate SDVC. Thus the 
criteria of this section provide several ways to reject all the minimax competitors discussed by 
Felsenthal, but only one way to reject the newer systems mentioned in Section 4.5. 
4. Dismissing eight criteria violated by minimax 
4.1 Section introduction and overview 
Much of the material in previous sections will be familiar to experts in voting theory, but most of 
the material in Section 4 is original. Sections 4.1 to 4.4 discuss five electoral criteria which Felsenthal 
(2012) shows are violated by all eight of the CC systems discussed there. Section 4.5 discusses three 
other criteria violated by minimax but not by all other CC systems. I argue that all eight of these minimax 
violations can be dismissed for one reason or another. I do not explore whether the violations of the 
first five criteria by other CC systems can be dismissed, because I hold that those other systems are all 
unacceptable for other reasons.   
Felsenthal calls these first five criteria no-show, twin, truncation, the subset choice criterion 
(SCC), and reinforcement or inconsistency or multiple districts. A voting system violates the no-show 
criterion if a voter can sometimes benefit by abstaining rather than voting sincerely. The twin criterion is 
very similar: it prohibits an anomaly in which two people who rank candidates the same find it beneficial 
for one of them to vote and for the other to abstain. The truncation criterion is also somewhat similar: it 
is violated if a voter can benefit by ranking only their first few choices rather than all of them. SCC is 
often called IIA for “independence of irrelevant alternatives.” A system violates SCC/IIA if the winner 
sometimes changes when votes are recounted after one of the losers drops out; the dropout is the 
irrelevant alternative. The multiple-districts criterion is violated if a candidate could win in each of two 
or more districts but lose if all the districts are merged into one.  
I’ll call a criterion an optimizing criterion if one of its major purposes seems to be to promote 
selection of the candidates who best reflect the popular will when everyone votes sincerely. I’ll call a 
criterion an anti-manipulation criterion if a major purpose of the criterion seems to be to reject voting 
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systems which allow some sort of electoral manipulation. The no-show, twin, and truncation criteria 
meet the latter definition. Many anti-manipulation criteria can also be considered to be optimizing. For 
instance, it may be hard to believe that a system failing any of these three criteria would be the best 
possible system even in the absence of any attempts at manipulation, so those criteria are also 
optimizing criteria. It’s nevertheless useful to distinguish between the two types of criterion, since SCC 
and multiple districts are solely optimizing criteria while the others are also anti-manipulation.  
4.2 The three anti-manipulation criteria 
Felsenthal (2012, p. 63) presents a 19-voter artificial example in which 5 voters rank four 
candidates in the order DBCA, 4 others rank them BCAD, 3 others ADCB, 3 others ADBC, and 4 others 
CABD. He credits the example to Hannu Nurmi. The minimax winner here is B. In the no-show and twin 
anomalies, three voters from the last pattern choose to abstain.  This changes the winner to A, whom 
those voters prefer to B, thus violating those criteria. In the truncation anomaly, all four voters in the 
last pattern truncate their ballots, giving only their first two choices. This changes the minimax winner to 
C, who is their first choice. These are interesting as mathematical curiosities, but there are seven 
reasons I find them unconvincing as examples of possible real-world manipulations. First, the data 
contain two Condorcet cycles: one with candidates A, B, and C, and one with A, C, and D. But even one 
cycle is quite rare in real data. Second, all the manipulations took 3 or 4 of the 19 voters, yet the key 
margins of victory (both before and after the manipulations) were all by one vote each. Thus there is 
nothing like our examples of burying or max-and-min in Sections 8.2.1 and 8.3.2, in which a few strategic 
voters reverse very large margins of victory. Third, to know their maneuvers would benefit them, the 
strategic voters would have to know almost exactly how everyone else would vote, including the two 
Condorcet cycles. But such certainty is rare; recall that on US Election Day in November 2016, some 
respected analysts were saying with 99% confidence that Hillary Clinton would win the presidency. As 
we’ll see in Section 8, burying and max-and-min may require no such knowledge. Fourth, if the strategic 
voters guess wrong, they would very likely harm themselves, since they are withholding all or part of 
their votes. Fifth, the voters must be persuaded to actually execute this complex and counter-intuitive 
plan. It makes me imagine a college math class with a full blackboard. Sixth, in most real elections there 
would have to be hundreds or thousands of strategic voters to whom this complex plan must be 
explained. The plan would surely end up in local newspapers, eliciting a mixture of outrage, amazement, 
and ridicule. This would alienate some voters who had previously planned to vote for the candidate 
benefited by the scheme, and it would stimulate opposing voters to actually vote. Seventh, after all that 
effort and risk, in two of the three maneuvers the participating voters don’t even get their favorite 
candidate, just their second-favorite one. For all these reasons, this example belongs in Alice in 
Wonderland; it does not seem like a maneuver anyone would actually try to execute in real life. 
We should still address these three criteria as optimizing criteria. But the whole purpose of 
optimizing criteria is to promote selection of the best candidates. Thus when one optimizing criterion 
conflicts with another (and these all conflict with CC), it seems reasonable to use computer simulations 
to see which criteria lead to selection of the best candidates. Section 5 describes a whole series of 
simulation studies. All found that the best candidates were selected by minimax, which violates all five 
of the criteria in Section 4.1. And we see in the next two subsections that there are also other reasons 
for dismissing SCC/IIA and multiple-districts. 
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4.3 SCC/IIA 
Is violation of SCC/IIA actually a flaw? Suppose post-balloting candidate dropouts seemed very 
likely in a plurality election we were planning. To deal with that, we could allow each voter to rank their 
top several choices, so vote-counters would know each voter’s top choice even after some candidates 
drop out. That clearly assesses voter desires better than the usual plurality system. But the usual system 
satisfies SCC/IIA, whereas this improvement makes the system violate SCC/IIA. For instance, suppose A 
would win with no dropouts, but B drops out and most of B’s votes go to C, who then beats A. So the 
superior system violates SCC/IIA and the inferior system satisfies it. Perhaps people consider SCC/IIA 
advantageous merely because that’s what they’re used to. 
Another argument also raises doubts about SCC/IIA. Imagine a sports league with three teams in 
which each pair of teams plays 9 games. Team A has won all 9 of its games against B, and B has won all 
its games against C, but C has beaten A 5 games to 4. Thus A has won 13 games, B has won 9, and C has 
won 5. If we named A the league champion, B would be a loser. But if B were suspended for hazing and 
became ineligible, and we therefore ignored the results of B’s games, we would be forced to choose C, 
who had beaten A 5 games to 4. Thus the initial choice of A violates SCC/IIA. But clearly team B’s 
ineligibility doesn’t mean that the results of its games are irrelevant to the choice between A and C. The 
problem with SCC/IIA is even worse, because even if B isn’t suspended or even accused of wrongdoing, 
we know that B could be suspended, so that choosing A would violate SCC/IIA.  
We thus see that each team (or each candidate in an election) has two roles: as a potential 
winner, and as a foil or standard of comparison for other teams or candidates. They may be useful in 
that second role even if they withdraw from the first. Darlington (2017) reports a wide variety of 
simulation studies, all showing that voting systems satisfying SCC/IIA select worse candidates than 
systems violating SCC/IIA, thus confirming that losers can usefully be employed as foils when choosing 
among the remaining candidates. Since the whole purpose of optimizing criteria is to promote selection 
of the best candidates, we see again that SCC/IIA is actually counterproductive. 
It might be argued that the sports analogy is misleading because the outcome of each game is 
due partly to chance, so C may have won most of its games against A just by chance. But each vote in an 
election may also be affected by chance; a voter might happen to hear A’s speech but not B’s. That 
doesn’t mean votes are meaningless; it just means some chance is involved, as in sports. 
4.4 Multiple districts 
Darlington (2016, pp. 12-13) describes an artificial-data example found on the internet, in which 
minimax violates the multiple-districts criterion. In that example, minimax makes candidate A win a 4-
candidate race in each of two districts because within each district, candidates B, C, and D form a 
Condorcet cycle with one large margin of loss for each of those candidates. But the cycles are in 
opposite directions in the two districts, so the cycles nearly cancel each other out when the districts are 
merged. C then becomes the minimax winner, which violates the criterion. Recalling Section 4.2, it 
seems that examples with two separate Condorcet cycles are a recurring theme in critiques of minimax. 
This example has two problems. First, the example is artificial, contrived, and unlikely to arise in 
real life. Second, the minimax choices actually seem to be the best ones, even in this rare situation. If an 
election involves just one major issue, define a “fringe candidate” as one supporting a position on that 
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issue opposed by most voters. If that issue has three or more possible conflicting solutions (such as 
where to locate a municipal facility), with each solution supported by a different candidate, and those 
circumstances produce a Condorcet paradox, then by definition, all those candidates are fringe 
candidates. There may be other more centrist candidates, such as one who says the issue needs further 
study. But in the two-district example the BCD cycle nearly disappears when the two districts are 
merged, so the fringe candidates become much more centrist. Candidate A was not in the cycle, so 
merging the districts didn’t affect A’s centrism. But the merger did increase the centrism of the other 
candidates, making C more centrist than A. Darlington (2016, p. 22) studied the ability of eight voting 
systems to find the most centrist candidate, and minimax was by far the best; see Table 6 on page 26 of 
that paper. Or see the results of a similar study in Section 5.4 of the current paper. That property made 
minimax pick C in the merged district despite picking A in the separate districts. It’s intuitively obvious 
that a formerly fringe candidate could become centrist if a conservative district merged with a liberal 
one, but the possibility of Condorcet cycles in opposite directions means that this can happen even if the 
two districts were similar in liberalism-conservatism or other policy issues. Thus minimax actually 
provides a good solution to a complex problem that many people hadn’t even considered. As with 
SCC/IIA, what appeared to be a fault is actually an advantage. 
4.5 Three famous criteria which conflict with SDVC 
Minimax violates three other important-seeming electoral criteria, but those three all conflict 
with SDVC. The first of these is the absolute loser criterion, which states that no candidate should ever 
win if they are ranked last by over half the voters. The second is the Condorcet loser criterion, which 
says that no candidate should ever win if they lose all their two-way majority-rule races against other 
candidates. The third is the preference inversion criterion, which says that no voting system is 
acceptable if it ever names as winner a candidate whom it would also name as winner if every voter’s 
ranking of the candidates were inverted. Few people can imagine how these criteria could ever be 
abandoned, but there are some surprisingly powerful arguments for doing so. 
The conflict between these criteria and SDVC is illustrated by the artificial data in Table 1. Many 
electoral theorists express little interest in examples with artificial data, having learned over the years 
that clever mathematicians seem to be able to create artificial examples that appear to prove almost 
anything they wish. But almost none of those examples give any explanation of how the example might 
arise in real life. I feel that examples should be considered seriously if they do include such an 
explanation, so I include one for this example. The explanation also helps us think about the example. A 
village must choose among three alternatives, such as three possible locations for a new park, highway, 
or municipal building. Three mayoral candidates A, B, C all advocate different choices, while a fourth 
candidate D expresses no preference and says the issue needs more study. If the three positions were 
equally popular and this were the only issue, then D would be the Condorcet winner, because the 
roughly two-thirds of the voters favoring A or B would rank D above C, and D would also beat A and B by 
about 2:1 ratios. But suppose D favors expanding the police force, the other candidates don’t, and most 
voters don’t. Suppose this issue is important enough to voters that D loses to each of the others by one 
vote. And suppose there is a large Condorcet cycle among A, B, and C, with A beating B, B beating C, and 
C beating A. As mentioned in Section 2, both Gehrlein (2006, pp. 31-58) and Tideman and Plassmann 
(2012) found that Condorcet cycles do arise in real elections. 
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These circumstances could generate the results shown in Table 1, which appears in slightly 
different form as Table 1 in Darlington (2016). Six voting patterns appear in column 1; each voter’s 
favorite choice appears first and their least favorite last. The pattern frequencies appear in column 2. All 
other columns are derived from these two columns. In those later columns, each candidate loses the 
races in which they are listed first, and wins their other races. Thus within Table 1 the “<” symbol can be 
read as “loses to,” as in “A loses to C,” and each column total is the first-named candidate’s margin of 
defeat in that race. An entry in the table is negative if the first-named candidate beats the other in that 
entry’s pattern, because that entry lowers the first-named candidate’s margin of defeat. 
Table 1 shows that A, B, and C each win two of their three two-way races but lose one. D is the 
minimax winner “by a mile,” since the Totals in Table 1 show that D’s largest loss LL is 1 while all other LL 
values are over 200. But the Condorcet loser criterion says D must lose, since D loses all their two-way 
races. The absolute loser criterion also says D must lose, since 303 of the 605 voters rank D last. If each 
voter’s ranking of candidates were inverted, D would become a Condorcet winner, winning each two-
way race by one vote, and would thus win under minimax. But D is also the minimax winner in Table 1, 
so minimax violates the preference inversion criterion. 
 Table 1. Hypothetical election results  
Pattern 
frequencies 
Margin of defeat for the first-named 
candidate in each two-way race  
Pattern 
A B C D 
D A B C 
B C A D 
D B C A 
C A B D 
D C A B 
Freq 
101 
101 
101 
101 
101 
100 
A<C 
-101 
-101 
101 
101 
101 
100 
B<A 
101 
101 
-101 
-101 
101 
100 
C<B 
101 
101 
101 
101 
-101 
-100 
D<A 
101 
-101 
101 
-101 
101 
-100 
D<B 
101 
-101 
101 
-101 
101 
-100 
D<C 
101 
-101 
101 
-101 
101 
-100 
Totals 605 201 201 203 1 1 1 
Vote changes 101 101 102 1 1 1 
 
Let each candidate’s “vote change index” be the minimum number of vote changes that 
candidate would need to become a Condorcet winner. In this example, each candidate’s vote change 
index is the smallest integer which exceeds half that candidate’s LL value, because each vote change can 
lower LL by 2. These values appear in the bottom row of Table 1. In real elections, with tied ranks, 
incomplete ballots, and write-ins, it may be difficult to compute vote change indexes exactly. But that 
doesn’t prevent us from using vote change indexes to discuss simple artificial examples like this one. We 
see that D needs only one vote change to become a Condorcet winner, whereas any other candidate 
needs over 100. 
If all 6 frequencies in Table 1 were increased by the same amount, even by thousands or 
millions, the vote change indexes of candidates A, B, and C would all rise by that same amount, while D’s 
index would remain at 1. The three famous electoral criteria would still say that D must lose, whereas 
SDVC and minimax would both say D must win. These facts bridge the gap between Table 1 and the 
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earlier mentions of thousands or millions of vote changes. Expressing the necessary vote changes as 
proportions of the total number of voters, we can say that for any number of total voters, every 
candidate except D would need over 15% of the voters to change their votes, and their LL values would 
all exceed 30% of the number of voters. 
Of the 17 voting systems mentioned in Section 2, the only ones naming D the winner in this 
example are minimax, Dodgson, Young, and plurality. But plurality fails SDVC in other examples. For 
instance, suppose voters differ only on a left-right dimension, and candidate A gets the 33% of votes 
farthest left, B gets the next 33% of the leftmost votes, and C gets the 34% farthest right. Then C wins 
under plurality even though B would beat either A or C by over 3 million votes if there were 10 million 
voters. Section 8.4 shows that Dodgson and Young have other problems. The Condorcet Internet Voting 
Service (CIVS), at civs.cs.cornell.edu, is the only free, highly secure, open-source voting service managed 
by a prominent researcher – Andrew Myers, who is also editor-in-chief of TOPLAS, the premier journal 
on computing languages. CIVS offers users the choice of several CC voting systems, most of which are 
newer and lesser known than the systems listed in Felsenthal (2012). But of all the systems offered by 
CIVS, minimax is the only one satisfying SDVC.  
4.6 Why D should win in Table 1 
Thus we face a situation that has arisen before in electoral theory: plausible-seeming electoral 
criteria conflict with each other, so we must choose which to ignore. All four of these (SDVC and its 
three opponents) certainly seem hard to ignore. But there are several reasons for keeping SDVC and 
minimax while dismissing the others. 
First, violations of SDVC seem likely to be much more common than violations of the other 
criteria, making the others less important. I ran a simulation to see how often, in random data, a 
minimax winner might be a Condorcet loser or even an absolute loser. (Any absolute loser must also be 
a Condorcet loser.) This particular simulation had 1 million trials for each number of candidates from 3 
to 10, with 75 voters in each trial. These 8 million trials never yielded a minimax winner who was an 
absolute loser. Those trials did yield 2 trials with a minimax winner who was a Condorcet loser; each of 
those trials had 4 candidates. Thus finding any of these anomalous scenarios in practice seems 
extremely unlikely. If minimax does happen to produce one of these anomalies, it can always be pointed 
out to voters that it’s reliably estimated that the minimax winner could become a Condorcet winner 
with fewer vote changes than any other candidate; see the fourth-from-last paragraph of Section 8.4. 
That point could also be taught to students in public-school civics classes. 
Second, the absolute loser and Condorcet loser criteria both have weaknesses. Absolute loser 
ignores the differences among all ranks except the last, ignoring for instance the fact that in Table 1, D 
has nearly three times as many first-place ranks as any other candidate. Condorcet loser ignores the 
sizes of wins and losses, ignoring the fact that in Table 1, all D’s losses are by one vote each. Borda 
counts are more comprehensive. In Section 8.2 I dismiss the Borda system itself mostly because of its 
susceptibility to strategic voting. But for more abstract discussions Borda seems like a good starting 
place. Many people feel intuitively that the difference between first and second place is more important 
than differences between adjacent lower ranks. The Borda system ignores that thought, but the plurality 
system makes it primary. We could combine those two systems by taking each candidate’s Borda count 
and then giving each candidate one more point for every voter who put them first. In Table 1 the 
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resulting scores for A, B, C, and D are respectively 1009, 1010, 1008, and 1208, so D is a runaway winner, 
just as under minimax. Call these BP scores, for “Borda plurality.” BP provides a reasonable argument 
that D should win, which makes no reference to CC or SDVC. 
Third, pages 29-38 of Darlington (2016) examine more closely the topic of Condorcet paradoxes 
caused by random sampling error. For those cases, Darlington derived a new maximum-likelihood 
method for finding the paradox-free population which would have made the observed sample paradox 
most likely. The method is called constrained multinomial optimization (CMO). For years the 
computationally difficult Kemeny system was widely accepted for its maximum-likelihood properties, 
though I am unswayed by that fact because Kemeny assumes voters all have the same goal and Section 
5.1 explains why that assumption is unrealistic. For each candidate X, CMO derives a likelihood ratio LR 
which measures the consistency between the sample data and the hypothesis that X is a Condorcet 
winner in the population. LR values range from 0 to 1. In Table 1, LR is 0.9992 for candidate D and under 
one in 600 trillion for every other candidate. Thus, at least if the example of Table 1 were to arise from 
random sampling error, D is overwhelmingly likely to be the true Condorcet winner. 
Fourth, the Dodgson and Young systems also pick D in Table 1, despite differing noticeably from 
minimax in their rationales. I confess that many more voting systems make D lose than win, but at least 
minimax is not alone. 
Fifth, common sense supports D as winner. Section 3 gave several reasons for considering 
Condorcet consistency (CC) to be essential, so under a Condorcet paradox it seems reasonable to try to 
pick the candidate who would need the fewest vote changes to become a Condorcet winner. Intuitively, 
it’s not immediately obvious that the number of vote changes needed should be the only factor 
determining a winner. If candidate A would need 99 changes and B would need 100, it seems there 
might be other factors suggesting B should win. But given the importance of Condorcet consistency, it 
would be very odd to say that under a Condorcet paradox, we can totally ignore the number of vote 
changes needed. Nearly everyone will recognize that in an election with hundreds or thousands of 
voters, surely some voted almost randomly and perhaps changed their minds shortly after voting. Or 
some voters couldn’t vote because of a sick child or a flat tire. It’s bizarre to have one or two such 
chance events deny a candidate the win when thousands of voters would need to change their votes to 
transform any other candidate into a Condorcet winner. Examples like Table 1 could appear in 
newspapers and civics textbooks, showing why the three anti-minimax criteria must be dismissed to 
satisfy the even more compelling SDVC criterion. 
Sixth, we have just seen that there are six very different ways to conclude that D should win: 
minimax, BP, CMO, Dodgson, Young, and common sense. Every one of these makes D the winner by a 
very large margin, whereas Condorcet loser and absolute loser each have D just barely losing, since just 
barely half of all voters put D last, and all D’s two-way losses are by one vote each. Considering all these 
points, it seems clear D should win. Thus we must abandon the three criteria saying D must lose. 
Seventh, all the criteria we’ve discussed here, on both sides of the argument, are optimizing 
criteria. When plausible optimizing criteria support the use of different voting systems, a reasonable 
way to resolve the conflict is to see which systems perform best in computer simulations. Section 5 
shows that a surprising variety of computer simulations all found minimax to be the best system tested. 
The Section 5 results for minimax and Schulze are of special interest. The Schulze system was carefully 
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designed to satisfy the three criteria which minimax fails, so the Schulze system has to fail SDVC. The 
fact that minimax consistently outperforms Schulze in Section 5 thus tells us to abandon those criteria. 
Since CMO was mentioned here, we should note that it is not a practical voting system for real 
elections. In the presence of real-world complications like write-ins, incomplete ballots, and tied ranks, 
the computations in CMO are too complex even for ordinary desktop computers, despite their great 
power today. But CMO is practical in the absence of those complications. For that simpler case, Section 
8 of Darlington (2016) describes a computer simulation study with over 5 million trials. In that study, 
minimax picked the same winner as CMO in over 99.99% of those trials. Thus CMO appears to be 
unnecessary as well as impractical. Also, CMO is based on one particular source of Condorcet paradoxes, 
and we have seen there can be several. 
Table 1 is surprisingly like the major examples that have historically been used to criticize 
minimax. See for instance Example 3.5.11.1 in Felsenthal (2012, pp. 61-62), which shows how minimax 
violates the absolute loser, Condorcet loser, and preference inversion criteria. Or see the much earlier 
anti-minimax Example 4 in Tideman (1987, p. 195). In each of these examples there are four candidates, 
with three of them locked in a Condorcet cycle containing margins of defeat which are large relative to 
the number of voters. There is a fourth candidate outside the cycle, who loses all their two-way races 
and is ranked last by over half the voters, but whose margins of defeat are all fairly small. Thus these 
examples are much like Table 1. In fact, Table 1 provides by far the best example of minimax’s violation 
of other criteria, because in Table 1 or its possible modifications, minimax makes D win by an enormous 
margin despite violating those other criteria. But Table 1 also shows that the other criteria must be 
dismissed for conflicting with SDVC. Those other examples are similar enough to Table 1 so that if 
anyone chooses to ignore Table 1 for any reason, they should also ignore a whole set of examples which 
have historically constituted the main arguments against minimax. 
5. Simulation studies on voting systems 
5.1. Why our computer simulations use spatial models of voter behavior 
This paragraph summarizes Section 5.1 so readers can decide whether they can skip to Section 
5.2. Voters may respond to differences among candidates on policy dimensions like liberalism-
conservatism, or on general-excellence traits like honesty, intelligence, and experience, or on both. Pure 
spatial models (explained shortly) recognize differences on policy but not on excellence. But differences 
among candidates in excellence tend to suppress Condorcet paradoxes while policy differences on 
multiple issues tend to produce them. Previous sections presented several reasons for dismissing non-
CC voting systems: flaws involving burying, incompleteness, vote-splitting and spoiling, and the rejection 
of non-CC systems by both the general public and many electoral theorists. The obvious major problem 
faced by CC systems is the Condorcet paradox. Thus we want to understand how Condorcet paradoxes 
arise, and also need to study how various voting systems behave under Condorcet paradoxes. Using a 
voting model which suppresses Condorcet paradoxes would interfere with both of those goals. 
Therefore our simulations should use spatial models.  
We now explain these points in more detail. Some models assume that voters all have the same 
goals, but they disagree on which candidates would pursue those goals most effectively, so the 
election’s primary purpose is to maximize attainment of the agreed-on goals. This case might arise when 
the members of a nonprofit organization are voting to choose the organization’s president, and they all 
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agree on the organization’s goals. In such models, the only relevant differences among candidates are 
on a trait we might call “excellence” or “general attractiveness,” and voters disagree with each other 
only because of random differences in their perceptions of each candidate’s true score on that trait.  
Other models assume that voters have conflicting goals, so the election’s primary purpose is to 
compromise among those competing goals. This case would presumably arise more often in public 
elections, where voters may differ on the desired amounts of military spending, business regulation, 
social-welfare spending, tax policies, regulations on drugs and sexual behavior, and other issues. This 
case is usually studied with spatial models. In these models we treat each area of disagreement (tax 
policy, military spending, etc.) as a policy dimension. Each dimension is represented as an axis in space, 
and we represent each voter and each candidate as a dot in that space, according to their positions on 
those issues.  Each voter is presumed to rank the candidates by their distance from themselves, with the 
closest candidate ranked highest. In the simplest possible spatial model, voters and candidates are 
assumed to differ on just one policy dimension, frequently labeled liberal-conservative or left-right. That 
model should not be confused with the excellence model of the previous paragraph, which has no policy 
dimensions at all. 
If we assume that voters are mutually independent and that we can measure distortions from 
sampling error, it’s quite easy to tell whether voters disagree on policy dimensions. Suppose first that 
we have at least four candidates. If voters all have the same goals, a voter’s choice between two 
candidates A and B should not correlate significantly with the choice between two other candidates C 
and D, because all differences among voters are presumed to be produced by random errors of 
judgment, which are presumed to be mutually independent. But such correlations could easily occur 
under a spatial model, even a model with just one policy dimension, as when A and C are both more 
liberal than B and D.  
A different test must be used if there are only three candidates. Under an excellence model, 
differences among voters concerning the excellence of one candidate B will tend to produce a positive 
correlation between the preference for B over another candidate A and the preference for B over a third 
candidate C; but such correlations should never be more negative than the laws of chance would allow. 
But under a spatial model, suppose those candidates fall in the order A B C from political left to political 
right. Then those on the left will prefer A to B and those on the right will prefer C to B, but few if any will 
prefer both A and C to B, so the aforementioned correlation will be negative. If any three candidates all 
differ on a left-right dimension, as in this example, there will always be one candidate between the 
other two, so negative correlations like this should appear. This is shown by an artificial-data example I 
ran with 1000 voters, 50 candidates, and two policy dimensions, with both voters and candidates drawn 
randomly from a bivariate normal distribution. In samples of 1000, all correlations below -0.1 are 
significant beyond the 0.001 level one-tailed. With 50 candidates the number of ABC correlations of this 
sort is 50·49·48/2 or 58,802. In my sample, 4075 of those 58,802 correlations were below -0.1, and the 
most negative correlation was -0.754.  
Tideman and Plassmann (2012) studied real-data elections with several candidates. From each 
election they formed all possible three-candidate sets, and tested whether those three candidates 
seemed to differ on policy dimensions. After studying hundreds of these sets, they concluded that the 
evidence was overwhelming that policy dimensions were important in the elections they studied. Many 
voting systems, including the famous Borda and Kemeny systems, were specifically developed for 
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excellence models. That suggests these systems will perform poorly in computer simulations using 
spatial models – a suspicion confirmed by a whole series of computer simulations by Darlington (2016).  
It seems plausible a priori that the candidates in a set might differ from each other on both 
excellence and policy dimensions, and the results of any of the aforementioned analyses would not 
eliminate that possibility. But intuition suggests that the larger the differences are among candidates on 
general excellence, the less likely a Condorcet paradox is to appear. My own unpublished computer 
simulations confirm this conclusion. Thus differences in excellence don’t produce Condorcet paradoxes, 
but rather prevent them. Therefore they don’t help us understand how the paradoxes arise, and don’t 
help us see which voting systems behave best under those paradoxes. Thus our computer simulations 
should use pure spatial models. 
Before asking when a spatial model could produce a Condorcet paradox, we’ll see how it could 
ever do so. For a simple example, suppose there are two policy dimensions X and Y. Suppose three 
candidates A, B, C are respectively at (1,4), (5,5), and (6,1) on X and Y, and three voters R, S, T are at 
(2,2), (3,6), and (7,3) respectively. Then the voter-candidate Euclidian distances in the XY space are 
 R S T 
A 2.24 2.83 6.08 
B 4.24 2.24 2.83 
C 4.12 5.83 2.24 
 
Thus voter R will rank the candidates ACB, S will rank them BAC, and T will rank them CBA, producing a 
Condorcet paradox. Many similar paradoxes could be created, with either few or many voters.  
5.2 Three artifacts that may produce Condorcet paradoxes in spatial models 
Under a spatial model, a set of voters is said to have radial symmetry if voters are distributed 
symmetrically on any axis in that space. Univariate, bivariate, and multivariate normal distributions all 
have radial symmetry. Plott (1967) showed that a Condorcet paradox can never arise in a spatial model 
with radial symmetry, because under radial symmetry any candidate will beat any other candidate who 
is farther from the center of the distribution. Thus if A beats B and B beats C, A must beat C. Thus the 
presence of a Condorcet paradox means there must be some deviation from radial symmetry. Three 
artifacts can produce the paradox: 
 1. Random sampling error. When we draw random samples of artificial voters and candidates 
from a bivariate or multivariate normal distribution, the fewer voters we draw the more likely the data 
are to show a Condorcet paradox, even though there can be no such paradox in an infinitely large 
population with a normal distribution. Consistent with this possibility, Tideman and Plassmann (2012, p. 
234) found that real-world Condorcet paradoxes were much more common in smaller sets of voters. 
 2. Voter misperceptions of candidate policy positions, due either to voter inattention and 
carelessness or deliberate attempts by candidates to deceive some or all voters. Using artificial data, 
suppose we use a spatial model to draw a random sample of voters and candidates, and we find it 
contains a Condorcet winner. Suppose we then add random error to the measured distance between 
each voter and each candidate, making those random errors independent across voters, candidates, and 
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trials if we conduct many trials. Those errors can represent voter misperceptions of candidate positions. 
The larger those errors, the more likely it is that the data will show a Condorcet paradox. 
 3. Asymmetric distributions. Suppose we draw a sample of artificial voters from a symmetric 
normal distribution and find the sample contains no Condorcet paradox. If we then apply a monotonic 
nonlinear transformation to those data to make the distribution asymmetric, a paradox may appear. 
 In Section 5.1 we mentioned models in which candidates differ in overall excellence and also 
differ on the policy dimensions in spatial models. We saw there that differences in excellence tend to 
suppress rather than produce Condorcet paradoxes. Thus we might ask here why differences in 
excellence don’t overwhelm and suppress the artifacts just mentioned, thus eliminating Condorcet 
paradoxes entirely in real data. I’ll suggest two reasons. First, in important elections, candidates must 
pass through a screening process even to get on the ballot; these processes may involve petitions, or 
endorsements by established bodies. Candidates low on general excellence may be screened out by 
those processes, so that those on the ballot differ little on general excellence. Second, Condorcet cycles 
are presumably noticed primarily when they matter – that is, when they involve the very top candidates. 
But these candidates may differ less in excellence than the most popular candidates differ from the least 
popular candidates. These factors may explain why Condorcet paradoxes among the top candidates are 
as common as they are. 
5.3. Which voting systems deal best with the artifacts of Section 5.2? 
 Darlington (2016, pp. 21-28) ran simulation studies comparing minimax to nine other voting 
systems, comparing systems on their ability to find the “true Condorcet winner” hidden by the three 
artifacts just mentioned. Minimax far outperformed all other systems in all the studies. Schulze was by 
far the best of the competing systems, so for brevity we here summarize the results comparing minimax 
just to Schulze. In a study on the ability of various voting systems to pick the “true Condorcet winner” 
who had been hidden by voter carelessness and inattention (see the list in Section 5.2), there were 6833 
trials (out of 100,000) on which one of the two methods picked the true winner and the other did not. 
Minimax was the successful method on 76% of those 6833 trials. On 100,000 trials in another study, in 
which the true Condorcet winner was hidden by random sampling error rather than voter carelessness, 
there were 5721 trials on which one of those methods picked the true Condorcet winner and the other 
did not. Minimax was the successful method in 82% of those 5721 trials. When the true Condorcet 
winner was hidden by transforming a symmetrically distributed policy dimension to an asymmetric one, 
there were just 1057 trials (out of 100,000) in which only one of those methods picked the true winner. 
Minimax was the successful method in 78% of those trials. Thus in all three of these very different 
studies, minimax beat Schulze by margins that can only be called enormous; as just mentioned, 
minimax’s winning percentages were respectively 76, 82, and 78. In each study Schulze and minimax 
performed equally in well over 90% of all trials, since either both picked correctly or both failed to do so. 
But large differences in success rates, always favoring minimax, appeared in the trials on which one 
method picked correctly and the other did not. Minimax is far simpler than Schulze, eliminating one 
possible excuse for Schulze’s underperformance. As already mentioned, several other systems did far 
worse still. 
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5.4 Two studies on “genuine” Condorcet paradoxes 
 We now turn to “genuine” Condorcet paradoxes – those produced by particular patterns of 
voter opinion, not by the artifacts of Section 5.2. Genuine paradoxes seem to require two conditions. I 
have no data on the topic, but I assume the first condition is reasonably common and the second is quite 
rare. We might call the first condition “multiple minority positions;” in it, there are three or more 
candidates, each advocating a different position, with none of those mutually conflicting positions being 
favored by a majority of voters. For instance, suppose voters in a city must choose among several 
locations for a park, highway, municipal building, or other project. Or the “positions” might involve the 
candidates themselves, as when the candidates all come from different ethnicities, religions, or 
economic groups which the voters perceive differently, so the question is which of those groups the 
winner will come from.  
The second condition is that these positions are favored cyclically, as when position A is favored 
over B by most voters, B is favored over C by most, and C is favored over A by most. For example, 
suppose a city has three neighborhoods about equal in size, and a sewage treatment plant must be put 
into one of them. Suppose that for odd geographic reasons, smells from a plant in neighborhood A will 
be mostly in A but also in B, from a plant in B will be mostly in B but also in C, and from a plant in C will 
be mostly in C but also in A. If voters rank these choices selfishly, a Condorcet paradox will appear. Or 
suppose a city’s electorate includes three economic or ethnic groups about equal in size. Voters in each 
group most prefer candidates in their own group. Voters in group A tolerate group B but detest C, those 
in B tolerate C but detest A, and those in C tolerate A but detest B. If a mayoral election includes one 
candidate from each group and voters choose based on group membership, again a Condorcet paradox 
will appear. These examples are artificial and contrived, and “genuine” Condorcet paradoxes may be 
quite rare. But we must allow their possibility, and we do that here. 
There is no reason to believe that the data patterns in “genuine” Condorcet paradoxes will differ 
from the patterns in paradoxes produced by random sampling error, so the two simulation studies in 
this section used data samples generated in the same way as in the previous study on random sampling 
error. The first of these studies used all but four of the 17 voting systems emphasized in Section 2. This 
study excluded the Copeland system because Darlington (2016) showed that when there is a Condorcet 
paradox, Copeland produces ties whenever there are just three or four candidates; and in a computer 
simulation in the same paper, it produced ties on over half the trials whenever the number of 
candidates was between 5 and 10. All that makes Copeland unacceptable in my opinion. The Dodgson, 
Young, and Kemeny systems were all excluded because they entail prohibitively complex computations. 
As mentioned in Section 8.4, that also destroys their transparency, which is also important. 
 This study used 100,000 trials, each with 10 candidates and 100 voters. On each trial, new 
candidates and new voters were picked randomly from a standardized bivariate normal distribution. 
Each candidate’s “centrality” was defined as 10 minus the candidate’s Euclidean distance from the mean 
of the 100 voters, and each voter’s rating of each candidate was defined as 10 minus the Euclidean 
distance between that voter and that candidate. These ratings were used directly in the range voting 
and majority judgment systems, so the winners in these systems were the candidates with the highest 
mean or median ratings. In all other systems, these ratings were used to find the voter’s ranking or 
other response to that candidate. In approval voting it was assumed that each voter approved any 
candidate whose rating by that voter exceeded a weighted average of that voter’s highest and lowest 
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ratings, with the highest rating getting 3 times the weight of the lowest rating. By this rule the average 
voter approved about 3 of the 10 candidates. In the plurality runoff system, the same ratings were used 
for the runoff, and the runoff was a majority-rules vote between the top two candidates. 
One system X was considered to outperform another system Y on a given trial if neither X nor Y 
produced a tie and X picked a more centrist candidate than Y did. X also outperformed Y if Y produced a 
tie and X picked some candidate other than the least centrist candidate. A square 13 x 13 table was 
printed, but is not shown here in its entirety. That table shows the number of trials on which each 
system outperformed every other system. It turned out to be possible to order the 13 systems so that 
every system beat every system below it in the order, by a statistically significant margin at the 0.01 
level two-tailed. Table 2 shows the sizes of differences between adjacent systems in that order. E.g., 
range voting and minimax were the first two systems in that order. Range voting outperformed minimax 
on 6835 trials while minimax outperformed range voting on 2433 trials. The fact that range voting beat 
minimax is of little practical interest, since Section 8.3.2 shows that range voting is extremely susceptible 
to insincere strategic voting. And this study gave range voting an unrealistic advantage, since the 
calculations assumed that every voter knew exactly the spatial-model distance between himself or 
herself and each candidate. 
Table 2. In the last two columns, systems are arranged in their order of performance on the current test. 
In each row, the number of trials on which the first system outperformed the second is shown first, then 
the number on which the second outperformed the first. Every system beat all those below it in the list, 
by margins which increased with the distance between the systems in this list. 
First 
system 
beats 
second 
Second 
system 
beats 
first 
First system Second system 
6835 
 317 
1916 
4623 
6850 
10813 
22320 
19869 
29913 
34441 
23871 
38682 
2433 
252 
1287 
460 
6214 
9737 
10253 
18311 
15577 
26481 
11628 
4411 
Range 
Minimax 
Black 
Nanson 
Schulze 
Coombs 
Borda 
Majority judgment 
Bucklin 
Approval 
Hare 
Plurality runoff 
Minimax 
Black 
Nanson 
Schulze 
Coombs 
Borda 
Majority judgment 
Bucklin 
Approval 
Hare 
Plurality runoff 
Plurality 
Table 2 doesn’t show it, but when two systems were far apart in the list, the upper system’s 
margin of victory was enormous. E.g., minimax outperformed plurality voting on 68,271 trials while the 
opposite occurred on only 2118 trials. Thus they chose different winners on 70,389 of the 100,000 trials, 
and minimax outperformed plurality on 97.0% of those trials. That’s an enormous difference. 
Also noteworthy is the difference between the Condorcet-consistent (CC) systems (minimax, 
Black, Nanson, and Schulze) and all other systems except for range voting, which must be dismissed for 
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its extreme susceptibility to strategic voting. The best CC system in Table 2 is minimax, and the best non-
CC system is Coombs. Table 2 doesn’t show it, but minimax outperformed Coombs on 8059 trials while 
the reverse occurred on only 2558 trials. That too is a very large difference, especially when comparing 
two systems which are both “best in class.” 
Also interesting is that the four voting systems which are probably best known (plurality, 
plurality runoff, Hare, and approval) are all at the very bottom of the list. It seems that all that work of 
inventing superior systems in the last century was not in vain. 
 The second of these two simulation studies was suggested by a remark in Young (1977, p. 350) 
that, for society to function smoothly, an office-holder should be preferred to all other candidates while 
they’re in office as well as at the time of their election. Thus if there is no Condorcet winner in the 
election, we might want to pick the person most likely to become a Condorcet winner in the future, 
even though there might be no formal election at that future time to certify the fact. As mentioned in 
Section 2, studies of real elections by Gehrlein (2006, pp. 31-58) and Tideman and Plassmann (2012) 
both found that Condorcet paradoxes appeared in only a small percentage of those elections. That 
raises the possibility that many of those paradoxes might have disappeared all by themselves if it had 
been practical to repeat the election a few weeks or months later. First I wanted to see if my artificial 
studies behaved like real data. In a study with 75 voters and 10 candidates in each trial, sampling from a 
bivariate normal curve, I found that a Condorcet paradox appeared 263,777 times in ten million trials, or 
about once in every 38 trials. That mimicked the real data fairly well, so I conducted the following study. 
This study followed the design in Section 5.3, again with 75 voters and 10 candidates in each trial. In this 
study, only trials with a Condorcet paradox were analyzed. Ten voting systems were applied to each of 
those trials. The computer program recorded which candidate was picked by each system on each trial. 
If a system produced a tie on a given trial, the program recorded that the system had picked no winner 
on that trial.  
 After all the voting systems had picked their winners, the computer simulated a second election 
by moving each voter a small amount in the two-dimensional space. This was done by drawing for each 
voter an observation from the same sort of standardized bivariate normal distribution already 
described, except that this new distribution had standard deviations of 0.01 instead of 1.0, so the scores 
found were much smaller than the initial scores. Like the original scores, these values had means of 0, 
with about half being positive and half negative. These values were added to the previous spatial 
position of the voter. Thus if both these new values were negative, the voter was moved slightly down 
and to the left. If both were positive, the voter was moved slightly up and to the right. If one number 
was positive and the other negative, the voter was moved appropriately either toward the upper left or 
lower right. In this study the 10 candidates in each trial were not moved, though that would be possible. 
After all 75 voters were moved as just described, they “voted” again. If these votes produced a 
Condorcet winner, the identity of that winner was recorded. If there was still no Condorcet winner, all 
75 voters were moved again by the same rule. If still no Condorcet winner was found, voters were 
moved again. A trial was abandoned if a Condorcet winner had not been identified after each voter had 
been moved five times. About two-thirds of all trials were abandoned as a result. Readers troubled by 
that fact should be sure to note another study mentioned at the end of this section. In the current study, 
the program ran until 100,000 second-election Condorcet winners had been found. In both of these 
studies, a voting system scored a “hit” on any trial in which it picked as winner the candidate who 
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emerged as the Condorcet winner after each voter made the small moves just described. A “miss” 
means that the system picked a different winner, and a “tie” occurred if the system picked no single 
winner because two or more candidates were tied for that spot. Misses and ties are both considered 
“failures,” and appear as such in Table 3. 
 As seen in Table 3, the study included eight voting systems described in Section 2 and two 
systems (SSMD and SSSMD) described in Section 7. The study used random tie-breakers for the Hare, 
Coombs, and Black systems. This elevated somewhat the numbers of both hits and misses for those 
systems. We shall see shortly that this did not affect the study’s most important conclusions. 
The ten voting systems just described are arranged in Table 3 by their numbers of hits. In the 
table, the number of “disagreements” is the number of trials in which minimax and the other method 
picked different winners, or one method produced a tie and the other didn’t. That column measures the 
similarity of a voting system’s results to minimax, not its quality. A disagreement between two systems 
is considered “relevant” to comparing their quality if one of the two methods picked the ultimate 
winner; most disagreements were “relevant.” The final column shows the percentage of relevant 
disagreements in which minimax chose the ultimate winner. The SSMD and SSSMD systems are high on 
those percentage losses despite being high on hits because they disagreed with minimax less often than 
most other systems did, even though they lost to minimax on over 90% of those disagreements. 
Table 3. Results for 10 voting systems in predicting a future Condorcet winner 
System Hits Misses Ties Failures 
(miss+tie) 
Disagree- 
ments 
% loss to 
minimax 
Minimax 
Schulze 
SSMD 
SSSMD 
Black 
 
Coombs 
Hare 
Plurality 
Approval 
Copeland 
  73017  
  67965  
  51734  
  51734  
  47901  
   
46223  
  27507  
  19661  
  10005  
    2057 
  26981  
  21878  
    5201  
    5219  
  52099  
   
53777  
  72493  
  70247  
  89976  
     324 
       2  
  10157  
  43047  
  43065  
       -  
 
       -  
       -  
  10092  
      19  
  97619 
26983  
 32035  
 48266  
 48266  
 52099 
  
 53777  
 72493  
 80339  
 89995  
 97943 
- 
12354  
 43067  
 43046  
 46192 
  
 51543  
 74313  
 82000  
 90012  
 97824 
- 
76.63  
 90.86  
 90.83  
 73.65 
  
 75.05  
 74.12  
 75.75  
 72.29  
 92.28 
 
The most important single fact in Table 3 is that all the entries in the final column exceed 72%. 
That means that when minimax picked a different winner than that picked by any other system tested, 
the minimax winner was over 2.5 times as likely as the other candidate to be the ultimate Condorcet 
winner. Schulze is clearly second best, with far more hits, and far fewer disagreements with minimax, 
than any of the other systems. This repeated the pattern found in the studies of Section 5.3, in which 
minimax also beat all other systems by substantial margins, with Schulze coming in second. But Schulze 
loses to minimax in 77% of the relevant disagreements between them in Table 3, fails the SDVC test of 
Table 1, and is so complex that many voters would have trouble understanding it. 
An alternative study looked at a different set of 100,000 trials, in which voters in every trial were 
moved until a Condorcet winner appeared, rather than stopping after each voter had been moved five 
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times. In that study the median number of moves for each voter was 14, the maximum was 2939, and 
12,023 of the trials had over 100 moves per voter. So the two studies were quite different in the number 
of voter moves. But in that other study, minimax was also the clear winner. 
5.5 Might inventing a Schulze tie-breaker make Schulze outperform minimax? 
The study reported in Table 3 used minimax-PM, which includes the tie-breaker described in 
Section 7. I know of no tie-breaker for Schulze. The results in Table 3 raise the question of whether 
minimax outperformed Schulze merely because it had a tie-breaker and Schulze didn’t, and in Table 3 
ties were counted as performing poorly. There seem to be two ways to answer this question without 
actually creating a new tie-breaker for Schulze. One is to ignore all the trials on which Schulze produced 
a tie, and to see whether minimax-PM still outperforms Schulze on the remaining trials. That method is 
actually biased in favor of Schulze, because it’s ignoring all the trials which Schulze found to be hardest. 
A second method is biased even more strongly in favor of Schulze. In that method we look only at the 
trials in which Schulze picked a winner by avoiding a tie, while minimax used its tie-breaker. Thus we’re 
counting only the trials which minimax found to be especially difficult and Schulze didn’t. 
I used both of these methods to compare minimax to Schulze. The general design of these 
studies was like that of other studies in Section 5. Every trial had 10 candidates. I ran one million trials 
with 75 voters per trial, another million with 100 voters per trial, and another million with 500 voters 
per trial. As in previous studies, we count only trials in which the two systems picked different winners. 
Together with the other conditions implied above, this meant we’re counting only a tiny fraction of the 
millions of trials in the total study. Mostly the two systems picked the same winner simply because a 
trial had a Condorcet winner, so both these systems picked that winner.  
In the first study, minimax beat Schulze 467 trials to 406 when there were 75 voters per trial, 
259 to 219 with 100 voters, and 17 to 8 with 500 voters. When these are all added together, minimax 
beat Schulze 743 to 633 across the 3 million trials. In the second study, minimax beat Schulze 447 to 364 
with 75 voters per trial, 240 to 196 with 100 voters, and 13 to 6 with 500 voters. When these are added 
together, minimax beat Schulze 700 to 566 across the 3 million trials. I presume these numbers get 
smaller with more voters simply because there are fewer ties with more voters. But remarkably, 
minimax beat Schulze in every one of these six comparisons, despite the aforementioned biases in favor 
of Schulze. Thus it seems clear that no new tie-breaker could make Schulze outperform minimax. 
Surely a lot more mental effort went into inventing the Schulze system than into inventing 
minimax. So why did minimax turn out so much better? I believe it’s because the Schulze system was 
carefully designed to avoid the three anomalies of Section 4.5: absolute loser, Condorcet loser, and 
preference inversion. That constraint forced Schulze to create a system lacking SDVC, whose importance 
we saw in Sections 4.5 and 4.6. The results of this section are further evidence of the need to accept 
SDVC and ignore the other anomalies. 
6. Strategic voting under minimax 
Recently Cornell’s Andrew Myers created for me a brief example of minimax’s susceptibility to strategic 
voting and the limits of that susceptibility. That example inspired this much longer discussion of the 
issue. Any errors are my own. 
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 Myers’ example involved a scheme with three candidates in active roles. Such a scheme could 
exist even if there are more candidates total; the extra candidates would simply have no role in the 
scheme. So we’ll imagine there are just three candidates A, B, C. Consider voters whose sincere voting 
pattern would be BAC. Suppose they are fairly confident that their candidate B will win their two-way 
race against C, but they fear that A may beat B and perhaps C. Then A will be a Condorcet winner if A 
beats C, and A would also win under minimax if A’s loss to C is smaller than C’s loss to B and B’s loss to A. 
The BAC voters could prevent either of those scenarios if enough of them insincerely vote BCA instead 
of BAC, thus tipping the AC race toward C without changing either the AB race or the BC race. That could 
produce a Condorcet paradox in which B has the smallest loss, so B would win. There would be no such 
thing as “too many” of them voting strategically; B would still win. I ran a computer simulation to see 
how often strategies like this might succeed. I found that if enough BAC voters vote strategically, they 
could succeed in this plot in a very noticeable fraction of all trials. 
 One voting system which is invulnerable to this strategy is Condorcet-IRV. In that system, as in 
minimax, any Condorcet winner wins. If a Condorcet paradox is found, Condorcet-IRV uses “instant 
runoff voting” (IRV) to select the winner. Under IRV (frequently called the Hare system), the candidate 
with the fewest first-place ranks is eliminated, the ranks of the remaining candidates are recomputed, 
and that process is repeated until only one candidate is left. That system is invulnerable to the insincere 
voting scheme just described because in that scheme the insincere voting occurs only in the lower ranks, 
and IRV looks only at the top ranks. 
 The Condorcet-IRV system does have three noteworthy disadvantages relative to minimax. First, 
IRV doesn’t allow tied ranks, and often doesn’t allow missing ranks, because as candidates are 
eliminated one by one, IRV always needs to know which one candidate is each voter’s top choice among 
those remaining. That can make voting much harder for some voters; see the discussion of ease of 
voting in Section 3. Minimax works just fine with tied and missing ranks. A voter who fails to rank a 
candidate is presumed to rank that candidate below all others whom they did rank explicitly. 
 A second problem with Condorcet-IRV is that it violates the SDVC criterion of Sections 3 and 4.5. 
Consider the example in Table 1. Candidates A, B, and C in that example are tied for the smallest number 
of top ranks, so in its first two elimination rounds, Condorcet-IRV would eliminate two of them. Then the 
remaining one would have more top ranks than D, so D would be eliminated. As mentioned in that 
section, that would still happen if equal numbers were added to all of the example’s six pattern 
frequencies. So Condorcet-IRV would eliminate D even if every candidate except D would need 
thousands of vote changes to turn them into a Condorcet winner, while D would need only one change. 
A third problem with Condorcet-IRV is demonstrated in a computer simulation which studied 
sincere voting. I found there that in trials in which minimax and Condorcet-IRV picked different winners, 
minimax was far better at picking the best candidates. I used a two-dimensional spatial model of voter 
behavior. Each trial had ten candidates and 75 voters, all picked randomly from a bivariate normal 
distribution. Then I used minimax and Condorcet-IRV separately to pick the winner for each trial. I ran 
927,351 trials total. I discarded 903,037 of those trials because there was a Condorcet winner who won 
under both systems, also discarded 11,134 trials because one or both systems produced a tie, and 
discarded another 3180 trials because the two systems picked the same winner even though there was 
no Condorcet winner. The program ran until 10,000 trials had survived this multifaceted weeding-out 
process. Minimax picked the better (more centrist) winner in 8769 of those surviving trials; that’s over 
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7/8 of those trials. These numbers also show that minimax outperformed Condorcet-IRV in 67% of the 
larger set of 13,180 trials with no Condorcet winner and no ties. 
Thus we want to see whether minimax is so susceptible to strategic voting that it must be 
rejected despite these three advantages over Condorcet-IRV. We’ll continue with this section’s opening 
example, in which voters favoring B are plotting to defeat A through insincere voting, by voting BCA 
instead of their sincere vote BAC. They hope to make A lose to C by more than B loses to A, so that B 
wins by having the smallest margin of loss in a Condorcet paradox, provided C also loses to B by a large 
enough margin.  
 If the plotters guess wrong and C actually beats B, and their plot makes C beat A as they 
planned, then C will be a Condorcet winner so the plot gives the plotters their least preferred outcome. 
In one subset of this scenario, there is a cycle under sincere voting, with C beating B, who beats A, who 
beats C, but with B winning because they have the smallest loss. Then the plot changes the outcome 
from the plotters’ most preferred outcome (B wins) to their least preferred one (C wins). Or if it turns 
out that B beats C as they had expected, and B also beats A, then their favorite B would be a Condorcet 
winner with no plot. So their plot will have been unnecessary but would do them no harm. 
 Now suppose none of those cases arises, and all margins of victory are in the direction they 
anticipated, with A>B and B>C due to sincere voting and C>A due to their plot. It turns out that their plot 
might still either hurt them or help them, depending on the relative sizes of the three margins of victory. 
Each line below lists the three margins in the size order assumed in that line, with largest margin first. 
Since there are three margins, there are six possible orders, as shown. The winner on each line is the last 
candidate listed on that line, because each candidate wins one race and loses one, so the minimax 
winner is the loser with the smallest loss – the last candidate in the line. 
A>B, B>C, C>A:  A wins 
B>C, A>B, C>A:  A wins 
B>C, C>A, A>B:  B wins 
C>A, B>C, A>B:  B wins 
A>B, C>A, B>C:  C wins 
C>A, A>B, B>C:  C wins 
 
Recall that the C>A margin is the only one which the plotters hope to affect through their plot. Study of 
these lines yields the following summary. If the plotters fail to make C’s margin over A larger than at 
least one of the other two margins, then they will have no effect, leaving A as winner. But they improve 
the outcome (from their point of view) only if the B>C margin exceeds the A>B margin; their plot doesn’t 
change either of those margins. If the A>B margin exceeds the B>C margin, they hurt themselves by 
making C win instead of A. So their plot requires a fairly accurate assessment of the outcomes. 
 Another point is worth noting. If the election has many voters, then the number of voters in the 
plot must also be substantial. If this is a public election there is no way the plot will remain secret, even 
before the election. It may well end up in the newspapers. This will alienate some of the voters who 
might have sincerely voted for the candidate benefited by the plot, and energize opposing voters to 
vote. Early and absentee voting will magnify these effects; the plot will then have to be advertised 
among participants that much earlier, increasing the chance that it will become generally known before 
Election Day, increasing the plotters’ problems just mentioned. 
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 Also noteworthy is that there may be two or more conflicting plots. If A and B are major 
candidates and C is generally considered a minor candidate, then those favoring B will try to make C 
beat A as described above, and those favoring A will try to make C beat B. If both groups succeed in 
those goals, then C will become a Condorcet winner, and both the A and B voters will have seen their 
least favorite candidate elected. So if you believe your major opponent will attempt this plot and may 
well succeed, then your optimum strategy is to execute no plot so that the winner will be your second-
favorite candidate instead of your least-favorite candidate. 
 Still another noteworthy point is the frequency of last-minute surprises in elections, some of 
which are intentionally held to the last minute by candidates or their campaigns. Even the weather can 
offer surprises. One group might carefully plan their strategy, then see it disrupted by a last-minute 
surprise. The US presidential election of 2016 provides an example of both the inaccuracy of prior 
guesses of the outcome and of last-minute surprises (some of Hillary Clinton’s work-related e-mails 
found on the laptop of a purported sex offender who was not her employee). 
 All this suggests that plots under minimax are complex and dangerous enough to discourage 
most of them. Thus society should try minimax as an experiment. We have already seen that many of 
these plots won’t remain secret even before voting ends, let alone after that. If it becomes obvious that 
some of these plots have actually succeeded, and voters everywhere start planning to try to imitate 
those successes despite all the complexities mentioned here, then we can accept that the experiment 
failed. 
7. Six variants and close relatives of minimax, and a tie-breaker 
It seems advisable to allow tied ranks on a ballot, since some voters may genuinely have no 
preference between two candidates. Let the number of “participants” in each two-way race be the 
number of voters who expressed some preference between those two candidates. As in most ranked-
choice voting systems, let’s presume that a voter who fails to rank a candidate would rank that 
candidate below all others whom the voter did explicitly rank. Thus the “nonparticipants” in any two-
way race are those who ranked the two candidates equally or omitted both. Since different two-way 
races will have different numbers of participants, Darlington (2016, pp. 15-16) defined minimax-P as a 
voting system in which we express each two-way margin of defeat as a proportion of the number of 
participants in that two-way race, and the winner is the candidate whose largest proportional margin of 
defeat is smallest. Darlington (2016, p. 16) found that in a simulation study, minimax-P cut the number 
of ties to a small fraction of what it had been with classic minimax, but classic minimax picked noticeably 
“better” (more centrist) candidates than minimax-P when neither system produced a tie. Neither of 
these results is surprising, the former for obvious reasons and the latter because races with more 
participants presumably produce more reliable results, and minimax-P ignores that fact.  
Darlington (2016) suggested enjoying the advantages of both these systems by using classic 
minimax as the main system, with minimax-P as a tie-breaker. If minimax-P fails to break the tie, he 
suggested using each candidate’s second-largest loss, then the proportional form of that loss, and 
continuing in that way through the results of all of a candidate’s two-way races. Call this minimax-PM 
since it uses minimax-P and also has Multiple tie-breaking steps. In this system, wins are considered 
negative losses and are also included in the analysis. Thus in the later tie-breaking stages, X might beat Y 
not by having a smaller loss but by having a larger win. PM should break nearly all ties. Simulation 
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studies by Darlington (2016, p. 16) show that both the P and M parts of PM do actually result in the 
selection of better (more centrist) candidates than random tie-breakers. 
Darlington (2016, pp. 15-16, 33-35) also studied two other variants of minimax he called 
minimax-Z and minimax-L. Both are more complex than minimax-P, but neither outperformed classic 
minimax in simulations, so he did not end up recommending their use. 
More recently, I studied a system I’ll call minimax-WV, where WV stands for “winning votes.” In 
WV the size of any two-way loss is defined not as a margin, but as the number of voters who voted 
against the loser. Thus each candidate’s LL value is the largest number of voters who voted against that 
candidate in any two-way race which they lost. If a Condorcet paradox is found, the winner is the 
candidate with the smallest LL. Like minimax-P, WV may yield a different winner than margin-based 
minimax when tied or missing ranks are allowed.  
My own intuition finds WV troubling. Suppose that in an election with 1000 voters, A lost to B 
499 to 500, with one nonparticipant, while C lost to D 0 to 499, with 501 nonparticipants. WV says that 
A’s loss to B exceeds C’s loss to D, since 500 voters voted against A while only 499 voted against C. That 
seems ridiculous to me. In one of the most convincing 1000-voter examples I can imagine against 
defining LL as a margin, 0 vote for A over B and 10 do the opposite, while 494 vote for C over D and 506 
do the opposite. Then C’s margin of loss exceeds A’s 12 to 10, although A’s margin is highly statistically 
significant and C’s doesn’t even come close to significance. But my personal intuition says that the first 
of these two examples of injustice is far worse than the second, so it prefers using margins.  
This conclusion is supported by a 10,000-trial simulation study comparing voting systems on the 
centrism of the candidates they chose. Minimax-WV lost badly to each of the three systems it was 
compared to: classic minimax using margins (2556 trials to 1397), minimax-P (4455 to 3120), and 
minimax-Z (4428 to 3079). Margins in minimax-Z are defined so their size corresponds very closely to 
their statistical significance. But simulations found minimax-Z to be slightly inferior to simple minimax at 
picking the best candidates. That suggests the previous paragraph’s second example can be ignored 
entirely. 
Darlington (2016, p. 26) studied two other methods similar to minimax. In the method he 
named SSMD, the winner is the candidate with the Smallest Sum of Margins of Defeat, and in method 
SSSMD it is the candidate with the Smallest Sum of Squared Margins of Defeat. Using analyses like those 
in Section 5, Darlington compared both SSMD and SSSMD to minimax on their ability to find the “true 
Condorcet winner” whose identity had been hidden by either (a) random sampling error or (b) voter 
misperception of candidate positions. In each of these 2·2 or 4 comparisons, minimax’s winning 
percentages were 96 or higher when either minimax or its competitor, but not both, picked correctly. 
  Thus the best system known appears to be minimax-PM, which uses margins and a multi-stage 
tie-breaker.  
8. More on the disadvantages of various systems 
8.1 Why “simpler” ballots can actually make voting harder  
Plurality elections suffer from vote-splitting and spoilers, and elections with runoffs certainly 
don’t simplify the voting process. So arguments for “simplicity” tend to focus on approval voting. But 
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approval ballots may make voting easier than ranked-choice ballots for the least-informed voters but 
more difficult for better-informed ones. If a voter ranks the candidates ABCD, the approval ballot forces 
them to also choose where to draw the line between “approved” and “unapproved” candidates. To do 
this rationally, the voter should consider whether the difference in merit between A and B exceeds that 
between B and C or between C and D. And for maximum impact a voter will also want to draw their line 
between the two candidates most likely to receive the most approvals from other voters, and therefore 
must guess who those two are. Thus a voter using an approval ballot must make three types of 
judgment not needed in a ranked-choice ballot. First, they must assess the relative sizes of differences in 
merit between various pairs of candidates. Second, they must guess which candidates are most likely to 
win. Third, they must decide how to combine these two judgments into a final ballot choice. 
We should also distinguish between requiring and allowing voters to express more detail about 
their preferences. If a ranked-choice ballot allows tied and missing ranks (as most CC systems do), a 
voter can choose the complexity of their response. A voter could imitate plurality voting by putting one 
candidate at the top and ignoring all others. Or the voter could imitate approval voting by placing two or 
more candidates at the top and ignoring all others. Or they could tailor the complexity of their response 
in other ways, for instance by ranking their top three candidates and ignoring all others. Or they could 
vote against one or more candidates, without expressing preferences among the rest, by putting all the 
rest at the top but omitting the objects of their special disdain. People can be informed about all these 
possibilities in schools or even through television entertainment. All these ways of voting, and others, 
are allowed by the Condorcet Internet Voting Service mentioned in Section 4.5. Darlington (2016, p. 14) 
shows how paper ranked-choice ballots can also allow a single voter to add one or more write-ins, while 
still allowing ballots without write-ins to be read by machine. 
8.2 Problems with positional voting systems 
The Borda positional system allows tied ranks but the basic Hare and Coombs systems do not, 
because ties could prevent us from determining each voter’s first or last choice. Other positional 
systems also differ from each other in this respect. There is no need to elaborate here on that point, 
since we argue here that all positional systems are inferior to CC systems. For simplicity we assume 
throughout Section 8.2 that there are no tied ranks. 
8.2.1 Examples of strategic voting under Borda and Coombs 
As illustrated by the Hare, Coombs, and Borda systems respectively, positional systems typically 
emphasize a candidate’s number of high ranks, or their number of low ranks, or some statistic similar to 
the candidate’s mean rank. The discussion of Burlington VT in Section 3 illustrated the problem with 
emphasizing the number of high ranks: this number is excessively influenced by the vote-splitting 
problem, in which even a Condorcet winner could get few top ranks because other candidates are so 
similar to them. But we now show that systems which emphasize average or low ranks are very 
susceptible to strategic maneuvers. To “bury” a candidate is to try to defeat them by insincerely giving 
them very low ranks. I’ll call the opposite maneuver “strategic elevation.” That name is my own, but the 
concept is very familiar to voters who use plurality voting. If a plurality voter regards candidate X highly 
but not at the very top, but thinks X has the best chance to beat candidates the voter really dislikes, they 
might strategically elevate X to the very top to increase the chance of defeating their least favorite 
candidates.  
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Section 6 showed that burying is rarely a real problem under minimax. But under Borda, 
suppose a voter would sincerely rank four candidates in the order ABCD, but they believe that B and C 
are by far the two candidates most likely to win. They prefer B to C, so they might choose to rank them 
as BADC on their ballot, thus strategically elevating B and burying C. Let mXY denote the difference 
between the Borda counts of candidates X and Y, with mXY being negative if X loses to Y. Then each step 
by which a voter elevates X or buries Y increases mXY by 1. Thus the more candidates there are, the more 
effective strategic voting might be. If c is the number of candidates, a single voter voting strategically 
might increase mXY by the same amount as adding (c – 2) voters who put X one step before Y.  
Thus even a landslide could be tipped by just a few strategic voters if c is high enough. For 
instance, suppose everyone agrees A and B are the two best candidates, and 55% prefer A to B while 
45% do the opposite. Thus A wins by a landslide under a common definition of that term. But suppose 
there are 4 minor candidates so c - 2 = 4, and 6% of the B-voters bury A. That’s 2.7% of all the voters, so 
it’s as if new B-voters had appeared in numbers equal to 4·2.7% or 10.8% of the original voters, thus 
tipping the election to B. The possibility of strategic voting also makes it far more difficult for every voter 
to plan how to vote most effectively, since they must try to guess each candidate’s chance of winning. 
They will feel obligated to make those guesses, since they will assume the opposing voters are doing so. 
The Coombs system appears to be most susceptible to strategic voting when there are several 
minor candidates who are about equally popular. We’ll focus again on simple burying. Suppose 
everyone agrees that the two best candidates are A and B. Seven minor candidates are all equally 
popular, with each sincerely ranked last by 1/7 of those favoring A and also by 1/7 of those favoring B. 
Suppose again that 55% of the voters prefer A over B and 45% do the opposite, yielding a landslide 
under sincere voting. But 30% of the B-voters put A last in order to bury A. That’s 0.3·0.45 or 13.5% of all 
voters. Thus the number putting each minor candidate last is (1 - 0.135)/7 or 12.4%. So A gets the most 
last-place ranks and is the first candidate eliminated. 
8.2.2 Is strategic voting a real danger? 
 Some electoral theorists have argued that there is little danger of substantial insincere voting. 
But these examples show that elections can sometimes be tipped even by small numbers of insincere 
voters, and Section 8.3.2 gives even worse examples. In a world in which newspapers regularly discuss 
charges of gerrymandering, “fake news” designed to change votes, and legislatures dominated by one 
party changing the voting rules to make it harder for opposing voters to vote, it seems naive to design or 
choose voting systems on the assumption that strategic voting will never be a problem. Campaign 
workers could even encourage their voters to vote strategically, claiming that other parties could do it or 
have done it. Suppose a magazine article were to show that around the world there were several 
instances in which later analysis suggested that strategic voting might well have tipped an election, since 
a noncontroversial and reasonably qualified candidate had lost under Borda because they got many 
ranks at the very bottom. That article could lead to a worldwide increase in the frequency of strategic 
voting, which would lead to more such articles, etc. Widespread strategic voting could lead to an even 
broader feeling that society and government are corrupt and need to be overthrown, violently if 
necessary. All that can be avoided by using voting systems as resistant as possible to strategic voting. 
 It might be argued that strategic voting could be moderately common, but still wouldn’t matter 
because all sides would do it equally. But voters for one candidate might be more inclined than others to 
vote strategically if (a) they fear they’ll come in second if they vote sincerely, or (b) their candidate 
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offers them some major benefit such as a tax break, or (c) their major opponent favors idealistic social 
programs opposed by the most selfish and Machiavellian voters, who are most likely to vote 
strategically, or (d) all three of those.  
Borda would also encourage major political parties to employ a strategic maneuver which seems 
odd today because it would actually be counterproductive under plurality voting. Again suppose the two 
major candidates are A and B. B’s party could identify political aspirants much like B ideologically but far 
less experienced and less known. The party could encourage them to run as independents, perhaps even 
supporting them financially. Then nearly all sincere voters in both parties would rank each of those 
candidates below B, but many voters in B’s party would sincerely rank them ahead of A because of their 
ideology. That would change the Borda-count A-B difference in the direction favoring B. Thus there are 
actually two ways to bury a candidate: persuade your voters to insincerely put them at the bottom, or 
add minor candidates in such a way that your voters will do that simply by voting sincerely. If this were 
done often, it would make elections more burdensome for everyone by adding minor candidates. 
8.2.3 Two Borda-based attacks on CC systems 
Are there arguments for positional systems? An anonymous reviewer for a very prestigious 
academic journal used two examples to attack CC systems for conflicting with positional reasoning. But 
closer examination shows that both examples actually support CC.  
In the first example, 1001 voters rank 6 candidates in the order ABCDEF while the other 1000 
voters rank them BCDEFA. Thus A is the Condorcet winner, winning every two-way race by just one vote. 
The reviewer considered it obvious that B should win, because every voter ranks B first or second, while 
nearly half the voters rank A last. B would win under Borda, or under a positional system in which the 
winner is the candidate placed in the top two ranks by the most voters. But the votes in the example are 
exactly what we would expect if C, D, E, and F were minor candidates sincerely ranked below A and B by 
all voters, and the B-voters all chose to bury A while the A-voters voted sincerely. Or even without 
strategic voting, this example could appear if votes were determined by a liberal-conservative scale like 
that mentioned in the discussion of Burlington VT in Section 3, with voters distributed symmetrically on 
that scale, and with every voter ranking the candidates in the order of their closeness to themselves. 
Suppose candidates B-F are all close together, in that order with B closest to the mean, with A on the 
opposite side of the mean and just a bit closer to the mean than any of the others. For instance, suppose 
the mean is 5, A is at 4, and B-F are at 6.01, 6.02, 6.03, 6.04, and 6.05 respectively. This would produce 
the central features of the current example, with A beating every other candidate by very small margins 
but being ranked last by almost half the voters. But A should win since they’re the most centrist 
candidate. This is actually the type of situation described in the last paragraph of Section 8.2.2. 
Anyone who finds these arguments unconvincing should show how else the example might 
arise. Also, A is the absolute majority winner, with over half of the first-place ranks. As mentioned by 
Felsenthal (2012, p. 21), failure to make any such person a winner is widely considered to be a serious 
flaw in a voting system. A also wins under the Hare and Coombs positional systems. That makes five 
reasons to deny that B “should” win: strategic voting, the liberal-conservative model, the absolute 
majority rule, and the Hare and Coombs systems. 
In the reviewer’s second example, 240 voters rank three candidates as ABC, 261 give ACB, 300 
give BAC, and 200 give CBA. Calculations show that among these 1001 voters, A beats B by one vote, A 
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beats C by 601, and B beats C by 79. Thus A is the Condorcet winner. A also wins under the Borda, Hare, 
and Coombs positional systems. Then 6 more voters appear, with two showing ACB, two showing CBA, 
and two showing BAC. By positional thinking, the three candidates are all tied among these six new 
voters, since each candidate appears twice in each of the three ranks. But adding these 6 voters to the 
previous 1001 changes the Condorcet winner from A to B, since B now beats A by one vote. A remains 
the Borda winner by a wide margin. The reviewer felt this exposes CC as ridiculous, since a set of votes 
showing a tie shouldn’t change an election’s result. That reasoning would also dismiss the Hare and 
Coombs positional systems, since under those systems the six new voters also switch the winner from A 
to B. My own guess is that if a neutral judge were asked to use common sense to choose a winner for 
this one case, without trying to specify a rule for all cases, they would say that C is an obvious loser, 
since C loses to both A and B by large margins. Thus we should choose between A and B by majority 
rule, so the six new voters should make B win by one vote although A should win without them. It’s hard 
to see why that is ridiculous.  
Since a reviewer for a very prominent journal presented these two examples as their main 
arguments for preferring positional systems over CC systems, and they were accepted as sound 
arguments by the journal’s expert editor, I infer that there is a severe shortage of convincing arguments 
for that viewpoint. In a computer simulation study, Darlington (2016, p. 28) did find that Borda 
outperformed minimax in one voting model, but this effect was reversed under other models. And the 
arguments here against positional systems seem quite telling. 
8.3. Problems with rating-scale voting systems 
8.3.1 Introduction and summary on rating-scale systems 
Section 8.3 is quite long, so I begin with a summary. Busy readers convinced by Section 8.3.2 
might choose to skip Sections 8.3.3 and 8.3.4, though I believe they are also quite convincing. 
The two best-known rating-scale voting systems are majority judgment (MJ) and range voting 
(RV). I criticize all rating-scale systems but focus primarily on these two. Insincere strategic voting is the 
biggest problem with all these systems. The strategic-voting example of Section 8.3.2 uses artificial data, 
but data which was designed to simulate real votes rather than to make MJ and RV look as bad as 
possible. Nevertheless, the example shows landslide elections being tipped if only 1.4% of voters vote 
strategically under MJ or only 1% under RV. Sections 8.3.3 and 8.3.4 show that under both these 
systems but especially under MJ, there are persuasive arguments which campaign workers can use to 
persuade their voters to vote insincerely by giving every candidate either the highest or lowest possible 
rating. I’ll call that the max-and-min voting strategy. Even without strategic voting, Section 8.3.3 (on MJ) 
and Section 8.3.4 (on RV) both give examples in which B wins even though 98 of the 99 voters preferred 
A. I argue that cases much like these could arise in real life.  
RV uses a numeric scale, often from 0 to 100, and the candidate with the highest mean wins. MJ 
uses a scale with non-numeric verbal labels such as “excellent” or “poor,” and the candidate with the 
highest median wins. If the number of voters is even, the highest rating in the lower half is used as the 
median.  If there is a tie between candidates for highest median, the ratings for each tied candidate are 
sorted from high to low. These sorted columns can be assembled into a matrix. In that matrix we find 
the row nearest the median row in which one candidate beats all others, and that candidate is the 
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winner. If two such rows are equidistant from the median row, the one below the median row is used. 
These rules will break all ties unless two candidates have absolutely identical distributions of ratings. 
Arguments for RV appear most fully at rangevoting.org. MJ was first published in 2007, but it is 
described and defended most fully by its creators Balinski and Laraki (2010). The book jacket can be 
seen online via Google Scholar, and is covered with effusive praise from Nobel laureates and other 
prominent electoral theorists. Aside from MJ’s many flaws, that’s the main reason Section 8.3 is so long. 
Rating-scale systems are often defended as the only systems satisfying the subset choice 
criterion (SCC), also known as independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Section 4.1 described 
SCC/IIA and Section 4.3 showed why it can be dismissed; it is not mentioned again in Section 8.  
MJ and RV are the only well-known voting systems which do not reduce to majority rule (MR) in 
two-candidate races. Those races are free of most of the paradoxes and anomalies afflicting multi-
candidate races. Therefore two-candidate races offer the simplest and clearest illustrations of the faults 
of MJ and RV. Thus we focus primarily on those races. After all, if a voting system doesn’t behave 
reasonably even in two-candidate races, surely we shouldn’t trust it to do so with more candidates – 
especially since a multi-candidate race can be thought of as a set of two-candidate races. 
8.3.2 Using MJ or RV, how many insincere voters are needed to tip a landslide two-candidate election?  
I used a one-dimensional spatial model to study this question. These models are described in 
Sections 1 and 5.1. I divided a standard normal distribution z into 1000 equal-area sections, and I placed 
an artificial voter at each of the 999 borders between adjacent sections, thus simulating a normal 
distribution as closely as possible with 999 voters. I placed candidate A at the distribution’s mean, with a 
score of 0. Thus A is the “perfect” candidate in this model since they’re the most centrist possible 
candidate. I placed candidate B at z = 0.257. That puts 601 of the 999 voters to the left of B, so B is 
noticeably but not extremely off center. These placements made 551 of the 999 voters closer to A than 
to B, with the other 448 closer to B. A spatial model assumes every voter prefers the candidate closest 
to themselves, so the model has A’s margin of victory under sincere MR voting at 551 – 448 or 103. 
That’s over 10% of the voters, so with sincere voting the election is a landslide under a common 
definition of that term. I defined each voter’s rating of each candidate as 10 minus the absolute distance 
between that voter and that candidate. A would win under either RV or MJ as well as under MR, since 
A’s mean and median ratings both exceed B’s.  
But then, starting with the most extreme voters at the end of the distribution in which all voters 
favored B, I changed the rating of each voter, one at a time, to max-and-min ratings. Specifically, I had 
each of these voters now give A the lowest rating sincerely given to either candidate by any voter, and 
each give B the highest such rating. I applied the changes to the voters at the far end of the normal 
distribution because I judged that in real life these would be the voters who could most easily be 
persuaded to vote insincerely to increase B’s chance of victory. Those at the extremes are often 
alienated from society, and thus could probably be easily persuaded to lie a bit to advance their own 
personal agendas. After making these changes for each voter (one voter at a time), I recomputed the 
two median ratings to study MJ, and stopped when B’s median rose above A’s. This took just 14 voters. 
That’s just 3.1% of the 448 voters favoring B, and 1.4% of all voters. It’s hard to imagine that B’s 
campaign workers couldn’t persuade that number of voters to vote strategically. When I did the same 
analysis using means rather than medians, thus assessing RV instead of MJ, it took only 9 insincere 
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voters to tip the election. That’s about 2% of the 448 voters preferring B, and under 1% of all voters. 
Thus RV is even more susceptible to strategic voting than MJ, though both are unacceptably susceptible. 
Note that in both MJ and RV, all these voters were counted as rating B above A even under 
sincere voting; the only switch was to insincere ratings. The MR result would not be affected at all by the 
insincere votes. That is, if vote-counters were given MJ or RV ratings and then applied MR after noting 
merely which candidate each voter preferred, they would find the same winner regardless of whether 
voters had voted sincerely or insincerely, and the same winner as in a poll with ordinary MR ballots.  
For those interested, here is more detail concerning this example. If a voter changes their rating 
of candidate X, it doesn’t change X’s median at all if the rating stays on the same side of the median. Of 
the 448 voters favoring B, the most centrist 198 rate both A and B above their own medians. If some of 
these 198 voters switch to max-and-min, under MJ it will help B by lowering A’s median, but it will not 
raise B’s. Under MJ the next most centrist 80 of those 448 voters cannot help B at all through insincere 
voting, since they already rate A below A’s median and rate B above theirs. The 170 least centrist of the 
448 B-voters rate both A and B below their own medians. If some of these 170 voters switch to max-
and-min, under MJ it will help B by raising B’s median, but it will not lower A’s. Thus under MJ there are 
“only” 198 + 170 or 368 voters favoring B who can actually help B win through insincere voting. It turns 
out that the 198 most centrist of these 368 voters have slightly less power to tip the election than the 
more extreme 170, since the tip would require 16 of those 198, not 14. I consider these to be details 
which weaken the example’s main point only slightly. A similar analysis for RV shows that the earlier 
paragraphs actually slightly understate the power of insincere voting; under RV any 9 of the 448 voters 
favoring B could tip the election by using max-and-min, and some sets of 8 voters could do so. 
MJ’s defenders might point out that MJ typically uses a rating scale with only 5 to 8 points, while 
this example used a scale with infinitely fine gradations. Thus in this example there is more “room” than 
in a typical MJ for an insincere voter to assign a rating at the very top or bottom of all ratings. But that 
doesn’t matter under MJ, since any rating above a median will raise that median as much as a rating at 
the very top of the scale, and a similar effect applies at the bottom of the scale. Thus the example’s 
criticism of MJ applies to any form of MJ as long as the extreme points on the MJ scale were above and 
below both candidate medians – a condition which is presumably nearly always met. When this example 
was modified to use a six-point rating scale, it still required only 14 insincere voters to tip the election. 
This example focused on MJ and RV, but any two-candidate voting system not equivalent to 
majority rule (MR) must be susceptible to strategic voting. MR counts equally all voters favoring a 
particular candidate, so any system not equivalent to MR must count some of them unequally. But when 
voters understand that some votes count more than others, they will have every incentive to insincerely 
give the response which they know will maximize their vote’s impact. 
It also seems almost inevitable that voters will ultimately respond to these incentives. Suppose a 
two-candidate election is run under some system other than MR, but for general interest or because 
some people demanded it, authorities also report the number of voters who rated each candidate 
above the other. Suppose voters then see that B won even though more voters favored A. That means 
that those favoring B had in some sense voted more effectively than the others. Those favoring A will 
immediately doubt the sincerity of the B-voters, so in the next election the A-voters will almost certainly 
vote insincerely themselves. Soon everyone will be using the insincere max-and-min strategy. Thus all 
two-candidate elections will reduce to MR. And the need for insincere voting – a need created by the 
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failure to use MR – will promote a general attitude of cynicism about politics and distrust of the 
government. Nationwide or worldwide publicity could make these adverse effects widespread even if 
they were triggered by just a few local elections. 
It seems clear that any system comparing measures of central tendency, as MJ and RV do, will 
be at least as vulnerable to insincere voting as MJ is. Strategic voters use extreme scores, and measures 
of central tendency differ in the amount they are influenced by those scores. E.g., a group’s midrange is 
the mean of the highest and lowest scores in the group; it’s obviously heavily influenced by extreme 
scores. Of all measures of central tendency, the median is the one least influenced by extreme scores. 
As already mentioned, if we change any score other than the original median score, while keeping the 
changed score on the same side of the median, it will not change the median at all. Thus it seems likely 
that MJ will be less vulnerable to insincere voting than systems which use almost any other measure of 
central tendency. But we have already seen that MJ itself is unacceptably vulnerable to insincere voting. 
8.3.3 Why MJ almost forces voters to vote insincerely 
 I just argued that MJ may require more people voting insincerely to tip an election than any 
other rating-scale system. But this section shows why under MJ, it may be especially easy to persuade 
voters to do that. For simplicity this section continues to focus on two-candidate elections. Any 
candidate will prefer that all their voters use the max-and-min strategy, so campaign workers will try to 
persuade voters to do so. This section describes three arguments which seem particularly persuasive for 
MJ elections. 
 The “post-election impact” argument is aimed at voters who favor a particular candidate 
because they favor that candidate’s policy positions rather than their good looks or magnetic 
personalities. Whether the office won is legislative or executive, a “big win” will increase the respect an 
office-holder receives, and it will thus help them implement their policies better than a smaller win. 
Therefore voters will want not merely to elect their favored candidate, but to make that candidate’s win 
as impressive as possible. Under MJ, news media will presumably publish the number of voters rating 
each candidate at each level of the rating scale, and politicians will study those figures carefully. Thus 
the bigger the difference between the winner’s figures and the loser’s, the easier the winner will find it 
to implement their policies. In fact, if A beat B without voter X, and X rated A just slightly above B, 
adding X’s ratings to the data set might actually lower the difference between the two sets of ratings 
and thus make it harder for A to implement their policies once in office, much as if X had preferred B. X 
doesn’t want that, and the surest and easiest way for X to prevent it is to use max-and-min. 
  The “no impact” and “reverse impact” arguments for using max-and-min define a “single-sided” 
voter as one who rates both candidates above the medians of both, or rates both candidates below both 
medians. In a spatial model, single-sided voters will be especially numerous if the two candidates are 
close together in space, since voters close to both will then rate both above both medians, and voters 
far from both will rate both below. In a simulation study in which the spatial positions of both voters and 
candidates were picked randomly from a bivariate normal distribution, on the average about 40% of all 
voters were single-sided, and that frequency approached 99% in trials in which the two candidates were 
especially close to each other. That study is described more fully at the end of this subsection. 
The “no impact” argument points out that if a single-sided voter were to switch their ratings, 
giving candidate B the rating they had previously given A and vice versa, it could not possibly change the 
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winner because neither of the two medians would change at all. So their preference between 
candidates has no effect at all on who wins. The “reverse impact” argument notes that a single-sided 
voter’s decision to vote could actually make their preferred candidate lose. For instance, suppose 4 
voters voted before X did, and their ratings were 1 2 5 6 for candidate A and 1 3 4 6 for B. When the 
number of voters is even, MJ uses as a candidate’s median the lower of their two central ratings. Thus in 
this example, B was winning because the calculated medians were 2 for A and 3 for B. Suppose X then 
votes, rating A at 5 and B at 6. This moves the medians up to 5 and 4 respectively, making A win even 
though X prefers B and B was winning before X voted. This illustrates MJ’s nonmonotonicity, which was 
mentioned in Section 3. 
In one sense the “reverse impact” argument is weaker than the other two, because it requires 
an exceptionally large gap between adjacent ratings for one candidate. But the real question is whether 
these arguments could be used to persuade voters to use max-and-min, and I think all three could be so 
used. Thus a campaign worker might say, “If you don’t use max-and-min, your vote might not really be 
counted, or might lower the published win size of your favored candidate, or might even make them 
lose. And max-and-min actually requires less hard thinking than the alternative.” 
The anomalies of single-sidedness can be pushed to an extreme. For instance, suppose ratings 
are on a scale from 1 to 6, with 6 high. Suppose 49 voters rate A at 2 and B at 1, 49 others rate A at 6 
and B at 5, and one voter rates A at 3 and B at 4. Then A’s median is 3 and B’s is 4, so B wins under MJ 
even though 98 of the 99 voters prefer A to B. Those 98 voters are all single-sided, so their preferences 
don’t count. Balinski and Laraki (2010, pp. 328-329) dismiss examples like this as contrived and unlikely 
to occur in real life. But in the simulations mentioned above and described more fully in the next few 
paragraphs, the number of voters whose preferences didn’t count did approach 99% in some trials 
designed to simulate real elections. And this paragraph’s 99-voter example merely extends to extremes 
the problems for single-sided voters which affect virtually every use of MJ. Note that the anomaly in this 
paragraph does not require insincere voting. 
The aforementioned computer simulation was as follows. I used a two-dimensional spatial 
model with a bivariate normal distribution of voters. I drew a random sample of 10,000 voters and used 
that same sample for all of the 100,000 trials about to be described, since I assumed that single set of 
10,000 voters provided an adequate approximation to a bivariate normal population. Then I randomly 
drew 100,000 pairs of candidates from the same bivariate distribution; each such pair constituted a new 
trial. In each trial I computed the Euclidian distance between each candidate and each voter, and 
defined the voter’s rating of that candidate as 10 minus that distance. I then computed each candidate’s 
median rating, and used those medians to label each voter as single-sided or not. The mean number of 
single-sided voters per trial (out of 10,000 voters in the trial) was 4004.7, and the median was 3929. 
Thus we can say that on average, about 40% of voters were single-sided. But as mentioned four 
paragraphs ago, those numbers were higher when two candidates were similar and lower when they 
were dissimilar. Thus the number of single-sided voters in a trial ranged from 0 to 9889, so there were 
trials in which about 99% of voters were single-sided.  
I also defined a voter’s “preference intensity” as the absolute value of that voter’s difference 
between the ratings of the two candidates. On average the intensity of single-sided voters was about 
66% of the intensity of other voters. Across all trials, about 32% of the total voter intensity was found in 
single-sided voters. But there were trials in which over 99% of the total voter intensity was in single-
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sided voters, since that percentage correlated -0.81 with the Euclidian distance between the two 
candidates and those distances ranged from under 0.01 to 6.87.  
In the 100,000 trials, there were just 1128 trials in which MJ and MR (majority rule) picked 
different winners. Each system picked the more centrist of the two candidates on over 90% of the trials. 
But when the two systems picked different winners, MR picked the more centrist candidate on 840 trials 
and MJ did so only on 288.  Thus MR “won” on 74% of these trials. That difference is enough to 
persuade a neutral outsider that MR is superior, even assuming everyone votes sincerely. It also turned 
out that the more single-sided voters there were in a trial, the more likely MJ was to pick the “wrong” 
(less centrist) candidate in that trial. And the results in this subsection seem more than enough to 
persuade many voters to vote insincerely in order to avoid being classified as single-sided by MJ. 
Darlington (2017) describes several other simulation studies showing how poor MJ is at picking 
the best candidates, even under sincere voting. 
8.3.4 Like MJ, RV can totally ignore majority rule 
Suppose we have a rating scale from 0 to 100. Suppose there are 99 voters, and 98 of them rate 
A one point above B, but the 99th voter rates A at 0 and B at 100. Then B’s rating total across voters 
exceeds A’s by two points. Thus B wins by RV although 98 of the 99 voters preferred A to B. B might 
seem like a reasonable winner in this example until we consider the possibility of max-and-min strategic 
voting. A single strategic voter who favors B would vote exactly as in this illustration, thus tipping an 
election in which every other voter prefers A. 
Campaign workers would not find it as easy under RV as under MJ to persuade their voters that 
they should vote strategically, since there is no obvious sense in which RV ignores anyone’s sincere vote. 
But other arguments for strategic voting still apply, such as the desire to make your candidate’s win as 
big as possible, and the fear that opposing voters may vote strategically and may have done so in the 
past. And as we saw in Section 8.3.2, it usually takes fewer insincere voters to tip an election under RV 
than under MJ. One reason for this is that if a voter favoring B sincerely rates B above B’s median and 
sincerely rates A below A’s median, strategic voting by that voter will not help B at all under MJ. But 
under RV every strategic vote helps the favored candidate, except for the rare voter who sincerely rates 
their favored candidate at the very top and their opponent at the very bottom. Thus overall, it’s hard to 
argue that RV is more resistant than MJ to strategic voting. 
8.4 Problems with the Dodgson and Young systems 
Aside from minimax, Dodgson and Young are the only well-known voting systems which satisfy 
both CC and SDVC. This section describes their limitations. I know of no countervailing advantages of 
these systems over minimax.  
Oxford mathematics lecturer Charles Dodgson is better known as Lewis Carroll, the author of 
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. In a pamphlet printed in 1876 and reprinted in Black (1958), Dodgson 
considered a voter who interchanges two candidates whom the voter had previously ranked adjacently, 
as when the ABCD ranking is changed to ACBD or ABDC. Reversing ABCD to DCBA would require six such 
interchanges. Dodgson suggested naming as winner the candidate who would need the smallest number 
of such interchanges, summed across voters, to become a Condorcet winner. In a different approach, 
Young (1977) considered voters who help defeat a candidate by ranking them poorly. He suggested 
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counting for each candidate X the smallest number of such voters who would have to be deleted to turn 
X into a Condorcet winner, and naming as winner the candidate for whom this number was smallest.  
Perez (2001) showed that both the Dodgson and Young systems lack monotonicity. The 
important writers Felsenthal and Nurmi (2017) consider monotonicity essential, and I agree. 
Nonmonotonicity also makes a system susceptible to strategic voting, and Green-Armytage (2014) found 
minimax to be one of the systems most resistant to strategic voting. 
The conceptual simplicity of the Dodgson and Young systems also masks substantial 
computational difficulty. Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe (1997) show that the Dodgson 
system is so difficult it can be a challenge even for modern computers. Rothe, Spakowski, and Vogel 
(2003) reach a similar conclusion for the Young system. Even if those difficulties can be overcome, 
they raise an important issue of transparency. A voting system is transparent if the average citizen 
can see that it would be difficult or impossible for corrupt insiders to alter the election’s results. But 
under Dodgson or Young, there is no way an average citizen could understand or check the necessary 
computer programs, meaning they would have to accept their conclusions on faith. That can be a 
major political problem when citizens don’t trust governmental institutions, as is widely true. In 
contrast, minimax would use a computer program which counts the number of voters who rank one 
candidate X above some other candidate Y, and does that for every pair of candidates. That program 
would be so simple that the program writers would have no plausible claim that the program must 
remain confidential to protect trade secrets, and even a small town would contain people who could 
check the honesty of such a program. Once that step is done, the remaining calculations in minimax 
are so simple they could easily be done by hand by almost anyone: we compute all the margins of 
victory and defeat, we find each candidate’s largest margin of defeat, and name as winner the 
candidate for whom this margin is smallest. 
Some European governments have attempted to maximize transparency by publishing replicas 
of all ballots. But according to Naish (2013), the Italian mafia appears to have devised a way to use this 
information to force many voters to vote as the mafia wishes, at least in elections with many candidates. 
They can direct the voter to put the mafia candidate first, but direct them to use the next few ranks to 
endorse a set of candidates so opposed to each other that no sincere voter would ever choose that set. 
Those ranks constitute the voter’s “signature” which allows the mafia to verify that the voter put their 
candidate first. We have just seen that minimax can achieve a very high level of transparency without 
sacrificing voter privacy. But that’s not true for the Dodgson and Young systems, since an outsider 
couldn’t really check every step without seeing each voter’s actual ranking of candidates, thus running 
into the Naish problem. The minimax-PM tie-breaker described in Section 7 uses the same vote totals 
used by simple minimax, and thus constitutes no greater threat to voter privacy.  
The Dodgson system can also make it easy to “bury” a candidate – defeat them by having voters 
insincerely put them at or near the bottom of their rankings. For instance, suppose we have 25 voters 
and 6 candidates A-F, with the following circumstances: 
1. All voters perceive A, B, and C as the best candidates and the ones most likely to win. Under 
sincere voting everyone would put D, E, and F at the bottom in that order.  
2. It’s generally agreed that the most likely winners are A, B, and C in that order. Thus voters 
favoring C will try to bury A and B, and voters favoring B will try to bury A.  
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3. A Condorcet paradox appears among these three candidates, with A beating B in their two-
way race, B beating C, and C beating A. A Condorcet paradox is an essential feature of any example 
comparing CC systems, since without the paradox, all those systems would pick the same winner. 
Consistent with all these specifications, we have: 
Pattern  Frequency 
ABCDEF 10 
BCDEFA                 8 
CDEFAB                 7 
 
The numbers of Dodgson interchanges needed to make A, B, or C a Condorcet winner are 12, 5, 
and 6 respectively. Thus A loses big, with at least twice as many interchanges needed as for either B or 
C. But under minimax the largest two-way losses of the six candidates, in alphabetical order, are 5, 9, 11, 
25, 25, and 25, so A beats even B and C by wide margins relative to the number of voters. This difference 
in outcomes is caused entirely by the presence of candidates D, E, and F and the burying strategies used 
against A and B. But D, E, and F are all losers by any reasonable voting system, since they are all ranked 
below C by every single voter. If we remove them from the race, the largest two-way losses of A, B, and 
C remain the same, so A still wins under minimax. But their Dodgson values become 3, 5, and 7 
respectively, so A now wins under Dodgson as well. With D, E, and F gone, A also wins under the Borda, 
Hare, Coombs, plurality, and many other systems, as well as under minimax and Dodgson. It thus seems 
clear that A is the best candidate, though Dodgson put A far behind B and C when all 6 candidates were 
included. And this is with just three minor candidates (candidates who would lose big by virtually any 
rule). The more minor candidates there are, the more “dirt” each insincere voter has to pile onto any 
candidate they wish to bury, and the fewer such voters it takes to bury a candidate.  
As mentioned above, Young (1977) proposed naming as winner the candidate with the smallest 
number of voters who would have to be removed to turn them into a Condorcet winner. He commented 
(p. 350) that the Young and minimax systems are probably very similar, and I agree. But if anything, 
minimax is superior to Young when we think more carefully about how votes would need to change to 
turn a candidate into a Condorcet winner. Since a Condorcet winner is defined in terms of two-way 
races, consider the three ways a voter could act more favorably toward B in a two-way race between A 
and B which A had won. (1) The voter could abstain when they had previously favored A. (2) They could 
favor B when they had previously abstained. (3) They could favor B when they had previously favored A. 
There are three parallel ways they could act more favorably toward A than they had before, making 6 
ways a voter could change. We would ideally like to consider the effects of all of those possible changes. 
If we did so, we would presumably want to add them up, presumably giving (3) twice the weight given 
to (1) and (2). The three parallel ways of changing toward A would be given negative weights, with the 
third again being given twice the weight of the others. The Young system considers just the first of those 
six types of possible change. One’s first thought is that it would be wonderful but completely impractical 
to consider all six of these types of change. But surprisingly, it’s actually much easier to consider all six of 
these together, using the additive rule just described, than to implement the Young system. That’s 
because the additive rule simply yields the change in B’s margin of defeat against A. Thus we can 
effectively implement that rule by using minimax, in which the winner is the candidate whose margins of 
defeat have the smallest maximum.  
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We can also say that the minimax winner is the candidate X who would need the fewest new 
voters, all putting X first, to transform X into a Condorcet winner, since that number is always just one 
greater than X’s largest two-way margin of defeat. But that statement about new voters doesn’t mean 
that minimax is ignoring the other types of voting change just mentioned; it just means that those other 
types of change can be transformed into numbers of new voters needed by the additive rule of the 
previous paragraph. 
As mentioned in Section 4.5, Darlington (2016, Section 8) found in a simulation study that 
minimax picked the same winners as the CMO system on about 99.99% of over 5 million trials. As 
mentioned there, CMO would presumably be the ideal system if all Condorcet paradoxes were caused 
by random sampling error. Thus by that measure, there would be little room for Dodgson, Young, or any 
other system to surpass minimax even if all the other problems with those systems were to disappear. 
8.5 Problems with the Hare system (instant runoff voting or single transferable vote) 
The Hare system is by far the best-known ranked-choice voting system, and has been used for public 
elections in at least eight English-speaking countries, though in few others. A serious problem with that 
system is the frequency with which a Condorcet winner can lose despite winning all their two-way races 
by majority rule. This occurred one of the first times the Hare system was used for a major public 
election in the US. That was in 2009, when it was used to elect a mayor for Burlington, VT. The 
Democratic candidate won all five of his two-way races, but was eliminated by Hare before either the 
Republican or the Progressive candidate, who won. In the two-way race between them, the Democrat 
actually beat the Progressive by a 7.8% margin; a 10% margin is sometimes called a landslide. The voters 
of Burlington found the Hare choice bizarre, and voted shortly thereafter to discard that system. This 
anomaly can never occur under minimax. 
To see how this can happen under Hare, suppose voters and candidates differ primarily on a 
liberal-conservative or left-right dimension, A is slightly left of center, B is very centrist, and C is slightly 
to B’s right. Then in a standard spatial model, A would receive top ranks from all voters left of the 
midpoint between A and B, and C would receive top ranks from all those right of the midpoint between 
B and C, while B receives top ranks only from the few remaining voters. Thus B might well receive the 
fewest top ranks even though B would beat either A or C in a two-way race. I ran a computer simulation 
with 10 candidates and 75 voters per trial and with 10,000 trials which had a Condorcet winner. Both 
voters and candidates were picked randomly on each trial from a univariate normal distribution. The 
Hare system failed to pick the Condorcet winner on 46% of those trials, confirming that Burlington’s 
experience could be quite common. 
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